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CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM AND DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED
Introduction:
The Constitution of the United States makes no
specific provision for administrative legislation, nor
for the administrative determination of particular gov-
ernment policies. Fundamentally, national and state
government in the United States rests upon the basis of
coordinated departments created by the Constitution,
Theoretically, the functions of the legislative,
executive, and judicial departments of a government are
capable of separation and under a simple governmental
regime there are not too many occasions to put the
theory of separation to a practical test. Administra-
tion takes an added importance as government enlarges
the field of its regulatory powers over the property and
affairs of private persons. In recent years the de-
velopment of this regulatory process has progressed at
a rapid pace with new emphasis upon the coordination of
governmental action through administrative bodies, at
the expense of the traditional separation of powers
doctrine
•
Indicative of this trend towards administrative
•
regulation in economic matters was the short lived
National Recovery Administration, as well as the Agri-
cultural Adjustment Administration, both of which were
created in response to an overwhelming demand from many-
quarters that certain elements in the making of economic
and industrial policy should no longer he left to the
market place and its flexible price mechanism but
should be placed in the hands of administrative bodies,
code authorities, crop control committees, etc. This
trend in the last two decades is not only a product of
I
emergency conditions, but is also a reflection of more
basic dissatisfaction with the results of laissez-
faire, such as are reflected in the trends towards more
powerful labor unions, in increasing aid for farmers
and for such economic organizations as will bring the
higher standard of living made possible by modern tech-
nology.
Evidence of this twentieth century movement in the
direction of more administrative regulation has not been
lacking as far as United States Tariff Policy is con-
cerned. During the Congressional hearings and debates
preceding the passage of the Hawley Smoot Tariff Act of
1950, a prominent protectionist asserted that the low
tariff advocates make whatever tariff rates they wished

provided they would leave the writing of the administra-
tive provisions of the law to the protectionists. The
main body of this study is an attempt to substantiate
the meaning and wisdom behind this last statement.
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
It is the purpose of this study:
1) to trace the origin and development of adminis-
trative regulation in United States Tariff Policy,
2) to evaluate the growth of the President's power
over tariff matters in the light of the principle of the
delegation of legislative authority,
3) to indicate the failure of the vague flexible
provisions (section 315 - Tariff Act of 1922) as a
practical solution to the tariff problem and the re-
sultant maze of administrative provisions and problems,
the application of which was largely dependent upon the
elastic interpretation of the tariff administrators.
The three fold purpose of this treatise falls into
two stages. The first has to do with the collection and
»
presentation of tariff information by an administrative
Commission. The second stage commences with the enact-
ment of the so-called scientific or flexible provisions
as a part of the Tariff Act of 1922. It is under this
latter division that the problems inherent in the United

States Tariff Commission's attempt to equate "differ-
ences in cost of production" are discussed.
DEFINITIONS 0? TERMS USED
Administrative : The term administrative pertains
to the act of administering something. In this par-
ticular study the word refers to the action of the state
in the exercise of its political powers. More
specifically, it implies the action of the executive
alone, or of the executive in managing the property and
business transactions of the state and in providing for
the general welfare.
Controls ; Throughout this study the term
control(s) shall be interpreted as the power or author-
ity of an administrator or administrative body to rule,
govern, guide, direct, restrain, or influence United
States Tariff Policy.
Problems ; The term problem(s) as utilized prin-
cipally in Chapter V has particular reference to the
questions that have arisen from the attempt at the
practical application of the nebulous terminology of the
flexible provisions, particularly Section 515 (c) of
the Tariff Act of 1922.
United States Tariff Policy : The words tariff
policy are to be interpreted as the procedure or chosen

course adopted by a government (in this case the United
States) in managing its tariff affairs. Depending upon
the objective to be achieved by a particular nation,
such as nationalism, imperialism, or freer trade, the
government of the nation in question will invariably
select a tariff policy that will coincide with and con-
tribute something to the overall end in view,
IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY
An enlightened citizenry has a vital interest in
the tariff issue. Under a democratic form of govern-
ment, the people's representatives in Congress determine
whether tariffs are to be imposed at all on imports from
foreign countried; if so, the principle to be used in
fixing the rates of duty; whether export subsidies are
to be granted; whether trade is to be quantitatively
restricted by prohibitions, quotas, or exchange con-
trols; whether in commercial dealings we are to ask and
give equality of treatment; whether there is to be suf-
ficient flexibility in the administration of the tariff
to permit reciprocal arrangements with foreign states.
The right of deciding upon and defining the above
mentional policies belongs to the people under a de-
mocracy. And the reason is obvious. The tariff affects
practically every phase of our economic life. Con-
•1
sidered from the standpoint of revenue, it becomes a
fiscal problem and raises many questions of public
finance. Viewed from the standpoint of the producer,
it becomes an industrial problem and requires a careful
analysis of all the factors which relate to the actual
and potential competitive strength of our diversified
industries. Considered from the standpoint of the con-
sumer, it raises questions of the incidence of taxation,
of the cost of living, and of distribution. Viewed from
the standpoint of our foreign relations, it presents
some of the most complex and difficult questions in the
field of international commercial policy.
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the
development of administrative regulation in our govern-
ment system has resulted in the gradual diminishing of
the power of Congress to determine many of the above
listed tariff policies. An intelligent citizenry should
be interested in the basic reasons behind such a move-
ment.
One of the primary causes has been the delegation
of legislative authority over tariff matters to the
executive branch of the government. There still exist
in many informed circles differences of opinion as to
the violation of constitutional principles involved in
ie
such a situation. In many respects this treatise at-
tempts to convey the consequences of such liberal legal
support.
Another reason for the trend toward administrative
control of our present tariff policy has been the
supposedly scientific "cost of production formula"
about which there has been much criticism of a construc-
tive as well as a destructive nature.
The need, therefore, of this study is an attempt
to clarify and analyze in my own mind, as well as in
others, the origin, development, practical application,
and accomplishments of the administrative regulation of
the United States Tariff Policy.
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CHAPTER II
BRIEF HISTORY OP UNITED STATES TRADE POLICIES
There never has been a time in the history of this
country when foreign trade has not played a part in the
economic life of the people. During the colonial era
an extensive trade was maintained by the mother
countries with their American colonies. Colonies were
designed to provide at once sources of raw materials
and outlets for the manufactured products of the mother
country.
The steady growth of the foreign trade of the
United States represents an interesting contrast with
our changing commercial trade policies. Beginning as
colonies which were established under the restrictive
mercantilistic policy of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, we came gradually to resent interference with
our commerce. In fact, modern historians claim that the
attempted enforcement of the Navigation Acts was the
chief cause of the Revolution. This would seem to have
set the stage for unrestricted world trade. The new
nation, however, was faced with the necessity for
raising revenue and hence imposed import duties which
were in part protective to certain American Industries,
especially the merchant marine. Protection of infant
•i
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industries soon became a part of American commercial
policy under the leadership of Hamilton and the stimulus
of the industrial revolution. There were shifts in
emphasis, however, from higher to lower tariffs as the
old persistent mercantil istic theories waxed or waned,
although the restrictive policy of higher tariff gained
ground. Through it all our foreign trade continued to
expand as we gradually pushed back the frontier. The
point to remember is that as we grew rich and powerful
our foreign trade grew also, reaching the imposing
peace time total of over nine and one-half billions in
1929, and this happened despite an overall protective
1
policy which was well designed to curb it. With
fluctuating economic conditions ever present, our
country's economic policy in trade matters was readily
capable of adapting itself in order to achieve maximum
benefits from the world situation. Thus the body of
this chapter is a brief historical and definitive ac-
count of the evolution of some of the more important
trade policies either past or presently adopted by our
government.
MOST FAVORED NATION CLAUSE
A most-favored-nation clause is "a clause inserted
in most modern commercial treaties providing that each
••
I
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party to the treaty extends to the other any favor or
1
concession granted to a third state."
In the use of the most favored nation clause dif-
ferent nations have adopted different views and
practices. European nations have generally employed the
so called unconditional form according to which conces-
sions or favors granted to any third State by one party
to the treaty are automatically extended to the other.
It has been the American practice, however, to make a
distinction between kinds of concessions that may be
granted; namely, "concessions freely made," or con-
cessions dependent upon some reciprocal favor. In the
case of free concessions the European practice is
omitted, but in the latter case where a favor is granted
to a third State in exchange for an equivalent, it is
held that the other party to a most favored nation
treaty is entitled to the same favor only after making
a compensation equal to that given by the third State.
Where this latter qualifying condition is expressly
stipulated in the treaty, the clause is spoken of as
"conditional."
1. Dictionary of Tariff Information, United States
Tariff Commission, Washington,Government Printing
Office, 1924, p. 489.
t
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The most favored nation clause appeared in a
primitive form in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries
in the treaties concluded by the Arabian princes with
the commercial cities of Spain, Prance and Italy. As
these treaties and the concessions therein with various
cities multiplied, it became customary for each munici-
pality concerned to demand as advantageous a treatment
as was accorded the most favored of the others.
It is in the seventeenth century that the clause
takes on its modern form. At that time, following the
breaking up of a number of national or city monopolies
such as those of Spain, Portugal, the Hanseatic League,
and the Italian cities, there was a wider development
of international commercial relations, carrying with it
the negotiation of numerous treaties. As each nation
sought to acquire the privileges accorded others, it
became customary in treaties to avoid the enumeration
of numerous previous concessions by simply extending
these concessions in a blanket clause - that of the most
favored nation. The clause at this time applied only
to concessions already made. Concessions subsequently
granted to third countries did not automatically apply
to the favored country.
A new phase appeared in the most favored nation
c
system with the advent of the United States among the
nations. This country found the previously prevailing
form of this concession contrary to its national interests
and granted only conditional most favored nation treat-
ment as defined above. This position was first taken in
the treaty with Prance in 1778. That treaty was followed
by a number of others in which the formula adopted in
the treaty was regularly repeated. As a matter of fact,
it was until 1922 that the conditional form of the most-
favored-nation clause was maintained in American
treaties. Changing conditions in our national life were
in that year recognized by the Republican-controlled
Congress. This Congress wrote into Section 517 of the
Tariff Act of 1922 the principle of equality of commer-
cial treatment - the principle that we should ask
equality of treatment from foreign nations and that we
should grant to them equality of treatment in our market.
At the time, Secretary of State Hughes seized upon
this declaration of policy and embodied it in our com-
mercial treaty structure. A confidential circular
signed by Mr. Hughes and dated August 18, 1923, was sent
to American diplomats throughout the world. It began,
"The Department desires to inform you confidentially and
for such comment as you may care to make that the
President has authorized the Secretary of State to

13.
negotiate commercial treaties with other countries by
f which the contracting parties will accord to each other
2
unconditional most-favored-nation treatment."
With the exception of the Cuban agreement this
policy was continued and extended in our treaty structure
by Mr. Kellogg and Mr. Stimson when they were in charge
of the Department of State.
While opponents of it obviously do not realize the
disturbing effect which attempts to return to the con-
ditional principle would have upon our foreign relations,
former Secretary of State Cordell Hull and the other
framers of the Trade Agreements Act realized too well
the long run effects of the policy when they wrote the
unconditional principle into the act.
EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS
"The President is the sole organ of the nation in
its external relations, and its sole representative with
3
foreign nations." These words of John Marshall, spoken
2. William S. Culbertson, Reciprocity, New York (McGraw
Hill Book Company, 1937) , p. 170.
3. Edward S. Corwin, The President, Office and Powers
(New York University Press, 1941), p. 208.
»
in 1799, state what has today become commonplace, which
is the reason perhaps why their precise significance has
been so rarely considered. Clearly, what Marshall had
foremost in mind was simply the President's role as an
"instrument of communication" with other governments.
Paragraph 2 of section 2 of Article of the Consti-
tution ordains that the President "shall have power by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make
treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senate present
concur."
Taken literally, the word "make" associates the
President and Senate throughout the entire process of
making a treaty, from prior to the initiation of negoti-
ations to the final ratification of the document. Such
consultation of the Senate as takes place today respect-
ing a treaty prior to its formal submission is usually
informal and via selected members of the Foreign
Relations Committee, the creation of which in 1816 as a
standing committee was tacit recognition that the pre-
liminary processes of treaty making had come to be
segregated to the President, as in fact the actual initi
ative had been from the first. So far as practice and
weight of opinion can settle the meaning of the Con-
stitution, it is today established that the President
(
alone has the power to negotiate treaties with foreign
governments; that he is free to ignore any advice ten-
dered him by the Senate as to a negotiation; and that
he is final judge of what information he shall entrust
4
to the Senate as to our relations with other governments.
The Senate role in treaty making, therefore,
ordinarily comprises nowadays simply the power of saying
whether a proposed treaty shall he ratified or not -
the act of ratification being the President's.
Instances of "treaty making" by the President
without the aid and consent of either Congress or the
Senate are quite numerous in our history. One was the
exchange of notes in 1817 between the British Minister
Bagot and Secretary of State Rush for the limitation of
Naval forces on the Great Lakes. Not till a year later
was it submitted to the Senate, which promptly ratified
it. Of like character was the exchange of notes between
the State Department and various European governments in
1899 and 1900 with reference to the "Open Door" in
China; the exchange in 1908 of so-called "identic notes"
with Japan concerning the maintenance of the integrity
of China; the "gentlemen's agreement" first drawn in
4. Ibid
., pp 233-234.
•*
1907, by which Japanese immigration to this country was
long regulated; the "modus vivendi" "by which after the
termination of the Treaty of Washington in 1885 American
fishing rights off the coast of Canada and Newfoundland
were defined for more than a quarter of a century; the
protocol for ending the Boxer Rebellion in 1901; the
notorious Lansing-Ishii agreement of November 2, 1917,
recognizing Japan to have "special rights" in China; the
armistice of November 11, 1918 - to say nothing of the
entire complexus of conventions and understandings by
which our relations with our "Associates" in the World
War were determined, nor yet of the considerable series
of agreements under which Presidents have at times
employed the Army and Navy in the supervision of elections
5
in certain of the Carribbean countries.
That such agreements are "treaties," in the sense
at least that they might have been submitted to the
Senate for it to pass upon, is clear. The Rush-Bagot
Convention is a case directly in point, and a parallel
to it is the agreement which the first Roosevelt entered
into with Santo Domingo ninety years later for putting
the customs houses of that bankrupt nation under American
5. Ibid.
••
control, in order to forestall its European creditors
attempting the same thing. The story is told by Mr.
Theodore Roosevelt in his Autobiography as follows:
"The Constitution did not explicitly give me
power to bring about the necessary agreement
with Santo Domingo. But the Constitution did
not forbid my doing what I did. I put the
agreement into effect, and I continued its
execution for two years before the Senate acted;
and I would have continued it until the end of
my term, if necessary, without any action by
Congress. But it was preferable that there
should be action by Congress, so that we might
be proceeding under a treaty which was the law
of the land and not merely a direction of the
Chief Executive which would lapse when that
particular Executive left office. I therefore
did my best to get the Senate to ratify what
I had done. The Senate adjourned without any
action at all; and with the feeling of entire
self-satisfaction at having left the country
in the position of assuming a responsibility
and then failing to fulfil it. Apparently the
Senators in question felt that in some way
they had upheld their dignity. All that they
had really done was to shirk their duty. Some-
body had to do that duty, and accordingly I
did it. I went ahead and administered the pro-
posed treaty anyhow, considering it as a simple
agreement on the part of the Executive which
would be converted into a treaty whenever the
Senate acted. After a couple of years the
Senate did act, having previously made some
utterly unimportant changes which I ratified
and persuaded Santo Domingo to ratify. In all
its history Santo Domingo has had nothing
happen to it as fortunate as this treaty and
the passing of it saved the United States from
having to face serious difficulties with one
or more foreign powers." 6
6. Ibid ., pp 237-238.
iV
In short, the substantial difference "between a-
"treaty" and Presidential or "Executive Agreements" is to
be found in the fact that the former is ratified by the
Senate. It has been contended that such "Executive
Agreements" bind only the administration entering into
them and the former contention is refuted by history, the
latter by decision of the Supreme Court, Of these,
United States v. Belmont, decided in May 1937, is the
most recent. The validity of such "Executive Agreements"
is not open to serious doubt today because of the above
mentioned and other repeated decisions of the Courts.
RECIPROCITY
"Reciprocity, as the term is commonly understood
in the United States, means a mutual exchange of tariff
concessions, with the understanding that these conces-
sions are not to be extended generally and freely to
7
other nations."
Chester A. Arthur, twenty-first President of the
United States, was the author of what is known as the
Reciprocity policy for promoting the export trade of the
United States.
7. Dictionary of Tariff Information, United States
Tariff Commission, Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C., 1924, p. 56.
A r
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However, a reciprocity treaty with Canada was nego-
tiated by William L. Marcy and Lord Elgin in 1854, and
was effective from March 16, 1855, until March 16, 1865;
but it was unsatisfactory to both countries because it
did not go far enough. It provided for a free interchange
between the two countries of natural products from the
farm, the sea and mine, but included no manufactured
products, which were not produced to any extent in
Canada and were still heavily taxed. Also, it did not
8
admit Canadian vessels to the American coasting trade.
During the eleven years of the reciprocity period,
the total trade between the two countries increased
approximately threefold, and for the United States the
trade with Canada became second only to that with Great
Britain.
The main courses which brought about the abrogation
of the treaty were the adoption of protectionist prin-
ciples and practices in Canada, the resentment aroused
in the United States by the attitude of Canada during the
Civil War, and the need of increased revenues by both
countries
.
For thirty years afterward, efforts on the part of
8. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science, May 1907, Vol. XXIX, No. 3 "Development of the
Foreign Trade of the United States" p. 15.
4
Canada to seek reciprocity treaties met with no success.
The result being that Canadian public sentiment was
aroused toward a "National," self-sufficiency policy and
reciprocity was not again attempted until 1910.
In 1910-11, another attempt was made to have re-
ciprocal trade treatment with Canada. Negotiations were
carried on to arrive at duty reductions and changes in
general tariff rates as they applied to various products.
Eventually a treaty was arrived at, passed by the United
States Legislature, and became an Act on the Statute
books of the United States. However, Parliament in
Canada failed to pass on the treaty. Therefore it
failed to be put into effect.
In 1875 a reciprocity treaty was concluded between
Hawaii and the United States. It is agreed that economi-
cally, the Hawaiian Treaty was unprofitable to the United
States. Nevertheless, when the Treaty was concluded
after being in operation for twenty years, it was
recognized that the political benefits far outweighed
the commercial ones.
Since the McKinley Tariff Act of 1890 provided for
the imposition of penalty duties upon imports from
countries which discriminated in their tariff treatment
against goods from the United States, it is considered
to be the first authorization ever given by Congress for
-•
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a comprehensive program of tariff bargaining.
Congress aimed by this Act to secure more favorable
trade relations with other countries by penalizing such
countries as did not treat American products favorably
rather than by following the method which had been
favored by the Administration — that of remitting or
lowering duties on the products of countries which in
return would make similar tariff concessions. The Act
gave the President, within prescribed limits, a free hand
in negotiations.
Under the terms of this Act, Secretary of State
Blaine began the negotiation of a series of agreements.
Between January 31, 1891, and May 26, 1892, ten recipro-
city arrangements were concluded. In most cases, the
other contracting party agreed to admit free, or at
substantially reduced tariff rates, the bulk of its
imports from the United States.
During the period of these reciprocity treaties
penalties were fairly effective, both as measures of re-
taliations and as a means of securing tariff concessions.
Exports from the United States to the reciprocity
countries showed a substantial increase.
9. Reciprocity and Commercial Treaties - United States
Tariff Commission, Government Printing Office,
Washington, 1919.
•
In 1894, the Democratic administration passed a
tariff act which did away with the reciprocity provision
of the McKinley Act. However, in 1896, with the incoming
of the Republican Party, there came a Tariff Act which
again provided for negotiation of reciprocity treaties.
President McKinley appointed John A. Kasson, of
Iowa, as special commissioner to "be assisted by a
"reciprocity commission" for the negotiation of agree-
ments under the Act.
Two series of agreements known as the "argol agree-
ments" were concluded;the first agreements were with
France, Portugal, Germany and Italy, whereas the second
series were negotiated during the first Roosevelt's
adminis tration.
In December 1899, the Kasson treaties were pre-
sented for ratification, but failed to be ratified. In
1909, the Tariff Act provided giving to all countries,
other than Cuba, notice of their reciprocity agreements
with the United States.
A treaty of much importance was that made with Cuba
in 1902. The bill provided for a reduction of 20 percent
from the American duties on civilian imports and reduction
of from 20 to 40 percent from the Cuban rates on American
products
.

This treaty was independent of the reciprocal pro-
visions of the Act of 1897, and was not connected with
the treaties negotiated under that Act. It contained the
provision that the reduction in duty specified should
not be extended to any other country, that during the
continuance of the treaty no Cuban sugar should be ad-
mitted to the United States at a rate of duty lower than
that provided by the Act of 1897, The fact must not be
overlooked that increases in trade with Cuba have been
due not only to the treaty of 1902, but also in con-
siderable part to the favorable influence upon Cuba of
the reconstruction program carried out under the assur-
ance of law and order guaranteed by the treaty of 1903.
The close political relations between the United States
and Cuba, the investment of American capital, the de-
velopment in the United States of large scale export
trade in manufactures, and the settlement in Cuba of
Americans -- these and other factors have operated along
with the tariff preference to increase the trade between
the two countries.
Summing up the reciprocity background of the United
States we can conclude that the reciprocity experience
under the Tariff Acts of 1890 and 1897 taught us certain
things to avoid. Each of the three methods contained or
developed defects. Experiences with penalty or addi-

tional duties under the Act of 1890 revealed that this
method alone was not adequate and it was supplemented
in the Act of 1897 by the concessional method without
abandoning the penalty method. The argol agreements
were satisfactory so far as they went, but they showed
that no adequate policy can be built on a small list of
non-competitive products, and no long and important list
of non-competitive articles can be formed. Then the
failure of the Kasson Treaties demonstrated the futility
of a reciprocity policy which provides that Congress
10
shall debate each agreement.
The success of reciprocity under the Acts of 1890
and 1897 was limited by the negative and confining
effect of the conditional most-favored-nation clause in
our commercial treaty structure. The evil effects of
this policy were corrected by the adoption in 1922 and
expansion under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of
1934 of the unconditional most-favored-national prin-
ciple.
In spite of the defects, however, the Tariff Acts
of 1890 and 1897 moved reciprocity into a position of
national policy.
10. Reciprocity - A National Policy for Foreign Trade
,
by William S. Culbertson, published by McGraw-
Hill Book Co. Inc., Whittlesey House, 1937, p. 162.

25.
We have come along from these pioneering days
through the conditional most-favored-nation clause to
the unconditional most-favored-nation principle, slowly
incorporating the principle of reciprocity into our
national policy. By careful and patient planning, we are
now trying to undo much of the harm of retaliatory
measures which resulted from our Kawley-Smoot Tariff,
by taking the initial step in negotiating treaties under
our Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934.
RETALIATION
In his message to Congress of December 4, 1885,
President Arthur also introduced the plausibility of re-
taliation when he requested that Congress "provide some
measure of equitable retaliation in our relations with
11
governments which discriminate against our own." The
desired measures were not forthcoming, however, until
the passage of the Tariff Act of 1890 which provided that
penalty duties were to be imposed upon imports from
countries whose duties on American products were, in the
opinion of the President, "unequal and unreasonable."
The section stipulated only five articles of which the
11. John Day Larkin, The President's Control of the
Tariff (Harvard University Press, 1936), p. 48.
«
majority of the exports of the listed items originated
amongst the Latin American countries. On the whole,
various Latin American countries resented the offensive
nature of the penalizing principle and the outcome was a
feeling of ill-will mixed with reprisals against American
made goods.
In 1884 the Democratic administration rectified the
unhappy situation somewhat when it did not include the
section having to do with retaliation in the Wilson Act.
However, when the Republican Party regained control of
Congress in 1896, they not only restored the retaliation
concept in the Dingley Act of 1897, but augmented the
Presidents control over treaty negotiations by the ad-
12
dition of the special "argol agreements" as well as more
13
general reciprocity powers.
The President was empov/ered by Section 3 of the
Dingley Act to reduce tariff duties without the consent
of Congress on a specified list of argols, brandies,
sparkling and still wines, paintings and stationery
after arranging for favorable advantages from the coun-
tried producing such items. Under Section 4 of the Act
12. Section 3, Tariff Act of 1897.
13. Section 4, Tariff Act of 1897.
•c
c
of 1897 the President was authorized to:
(a) make five year treaties,
(b) promise a reduction of 20% in tariff rates for
imports originating in a country making com-
pensating concessions,
(c) if goods exported from an agreement country
were not produced in the United States they
could be put on the free list.
Treaties negotiated under the conditions of Section
4 were unlike Section 3 in that they required the normal
ratification by two-thirds of the Senate, as well as the
approval of the House.
For the negotiation of agreements under the Act, we
noted previously in this chapter (under "Reciprocity")
that President McKinley appointed a "Reciprocity
Commission" under the direction of Mr. John A. Kasson.
The results achieved by the operation of the argol pro-
visions were highly successful. A long list of agreements
were signed with France, Portugal, Italy, Germany, and
Switzerland, whereby duties on American exports were re-
duced for similar reductions on items in the argol list.
A second list of argol agreements were negotiated during
the Roosevelt Administration (1901-1909); they lasted
until the passage of the Payne Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909.
As for the group of treaties negotiated under the
provisions of Section 4, which were to grant a 20% reduc-
tion in the tariff duties of the United States in return

for equal concessions from foreign nations - they failed
to be ratified by Congress.
The retaliatory principle was continued in the
Tariff Act of 1909. With the inclusion of the "maximum
and minimum" provision, the former schedule of rates
could be used to penalize foreign countries that dis-
criminated against United States exports; whereas the
latter schedule of rates was high enough to provide
normal protection to American products.
Contemporary use of the retaliatory principle is to
be found in section 317 of the Tariff Act of 1922 and re-
peated in section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930. These
sections authorize the President to penalize with addi-
tional duties or by means of an embargo the goods coming
from a foreign nation which "discriminate in fact against
the commerce of the United States." The general inter-
pretation of the words "in fact" is the existence of a
special arrangement between two countries providing lower
tariff duties to each other than the United States enjoys
with either of them. In other words, the President is
empowered to penalize American destined exports from
nations which have concluded a reciprocal arrangement or
most -favored-nation agreement to the exclusion of the
United States.
ri
The inconsistency of our present retaliatory policy
is rather obvious. We, as a nation, claim that we will
definitely not tolerate hut will penalize exclusive
agreements between two foreign nations; nevertheless, we
openly continue our conditional most-favored-nation
agreement with Cuba. Under the Reciprocal Trade Agree-
ments Program of 1934 we have assumed an uncondi tional
most-favored-nation policy without entirely eliminating
all traces of our previous conditional trading policy.
The retaliatory powers vested in the President manifest
the possession of a high degree of administrative power.
Successive Presidents since 1922 have seemed to
recognize the inherent difficulties and inconsistencies in
the retaliatory policy; therefore they have been extremely
cautious in exercising their discretion under sections
317 and 3 38 of the two most recent tariff laws.
The purpose of reciprocity may be to develop
foreign markets for the products of a country, to promote
closer political relations, to assist weaker economic
units, or it may be a combination of all these ends. On
the other hand our reciprocity agreement with Cuba is a
special arrangement which is, in the long run, generally
14. For definition of terms see section on Most Favored
Nation clause (Chapter II).

undesirable for the reason that it tends to discriminate
against third countries.
r
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CHAPTER III
ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES TARIFF COMMISSION
REVENUE COMMISSION OF 1365
As early as 1865 Congress solicited the assistance
of an outside administrative body in formulating tariff
legislation. The desperate need of funds to continue the
prosecution of the Civil War necessitated the Act of
March 3, 1865, which provided that:
"The Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized
to appoint a Commission, consisting of three per-
sons to inquire and report at the earliest
practicable moment upon the subject of raising by
taxation such revenue as may be necessary in order
to supply the wants of the government, having re-
gard to and including the sources from which such
revenue should be drawn and the best and most ef-
ficient mode of raising the same, and to report
the form in a bill." 1
Following the termination of the Civil War, the
function of the three -man Revenue Commission was changed
to that of an advisory Commission concerned with modifi-
cation in the existing Tariff and Internal Revenue Laws.
Many recommendations of the Commission were adopted by
the Committee of Ways and Means in the bills submitted
to the thirty-ninth Congress. Subsequently, the Secre-
tary of the Treasury was empowered by the Act of July 13,
1. 13 United States Statutes at Large 487,

1866, to appoint a special Commissioner of Revenue to
hold office to the close of the fiscal year 1869-1870.
The Commissioner selected was a Mr. David A Wells,
who had been Chairman of the Revenue Commission of 1865.
Wells "executed his commission with conscientious faith-
fulness and industry and collected a large amount of
2
valuable data;" but he advocated a policy of free trade
at a time when the controlling opinion was bent towards
protection. A different authority on the subject criti-
cized the Commissioner's reports by stating that they
were "characterized by passionate partisanship and a
3
controversial spirit unbecoming a public officer."
Undoubtedly Mr. D. A. Wells ' Influence "brought the
4
Commission's expert service into disrepute," for it
wasn't until 1882, eighteen years later, that another
attempt was made with a Commission.
2. Andrew C. McLaughlin and Albert H. Bushnell,
Cyclopedia of American Government (New York and
London: D. Appleton and Co. 1914) III, p. 472.
3. Edward A. Stanwood, American Tariff Controversies
in the Nineteenth Century (Boston; Houghton
Mifflin Co. 1903) I, p. 161.
4. McLaughlin and Bushnell, op. clt
. , p. 472.

TARIFF COMMISSION OF 1882
Between the fiscal years 1874-1880, the accumulation
of excessive surpluses in the Federal Treasury and their
application toward the rapid reduction of the public
debt was not considered as a desirable monetary situ-
ation; therefore, it was recognized that a reduction in
taxes and a revision of the Tariff was necessary. While
the inflated condition of the Treasury was the primary
reason for the establishment of a Commission, other
factors (which in later years increased in relative
importance) were of some influence.
Foremost amongst these causes was the then prevalent
inequality in existing tariff rates brought about by
scientific advancement and technological innovations in
industry. Secondly, there was a realization by members
of Congress that the framing of Tariff legislation
imposed an increasing hardship on their body and injus-
tices and errors were bound to result.
By the Act of May 15, 1882, Congress authorized the
appointment of a Commission composed of nine persons
from civil life with instructions
"to take into consideration and to investigate all
the various questions relative to the agricul-
tural, commercial, mining, manufacturing, mercan-
tile and industrial interests of the United
States, so far as the same may be necessary to
»
the establishment of a judicious tariff, or a
revision of the existing tariff, upon a scale
of justice to all interests, and for the pur-
pose of fully examining the matters which may
come before it." 5
The Commission labored diligently in the six months
allotted for the preparation of its report. Foremost
amongst the results of its investigations were recommen-
dations for the creation of a Customs Court and a
general twenty percent reduction of existing tariff
duties. However, "Congress practically disregarded the
Commission's report and each chamber proceeded to draft
a bill independently, accompanied by the usual sectional
and industrial controversies as each interest attempted
to gain the maximum benefits from the proposed legisla-
6
tion. 11
The outcome of this apparent failure of the work
of the Commission was the discouragement for many years
of any proposal to delegate to any administrative board
or Commission the power to assist Congress in framing
tariff legislation. Nevertheless, historical evidence
has manifested the fact that the work of the Tariff
Commission of 1882 was not in vain. In fact, one
5. 22 United States Statutes at Large 54.
6. Joshua Bernhardt, The Tariff Commission - Its
History, Activities~"and Organization
.
(New York:
D. Appleton and Co. 1922) p. 8.
_____
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eminent authority on the subject has expressed himself
by saying "the Tariff of 1883 was a better piece of
legislation because of the recommendations of the Com-
7
mission than it would have been without them."
COST OF PRODUCTION STUDY BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
"The direct cause for the third attempt to provide
for the study of tariff rates and problems was the in-
creasing significance of the theory of international
8
comparative production costs." By the Act of June 13,
1888, a new Democratic Congress directed the newly
created Department of Labor
"to ascertain, at as early a date as possible,
and whenever industrial changes shall make it
essential, the cost of producing articles at
the time dutiable in the United States, in
leading countries where such articles are pro-
duced, by fully specified units of production,
and under a classification showing the different
elements of cost, or approximate cost of such
articles of production, including the wages
paid in such industries per day, week, month,
or year, or by the piece; and hours employed
per day; and the profits of the manufacturers
and producers of such articles; and the compara-
tive cost of living, and the kind of living." 9
In accordance with the provisions of the Act, a
special Bureau in the Department of Commerce and Labor
7. Frank W. Taussig, Free Trade, Reciprocity, and the
Tariff (New York: The Macmillan Co.1920), p. 187.
8. Bernhardt, op. cit
. , p. 8.
9. 25 United States Statutes at Large 182.
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was established in 1888 for the purpose of making inves-
tigations into comparative production costs. The work
of this Bureau was completed in 1891 and the results
were published as the sixth and seventh Annual Reports
of the Commissioner of Labor. Due to the advent of the
McKinley Administration with its inherent protectionist
policy, the work of the Bureau was considerably cur-
tailed. The Bureau remained more or less dormant until
1912, when, with the return of the Democratic Party to
power, the cost of production study was re-created in
the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce.
THE TARIFF BOARD 1910-1912
With the increasing growth of monopolies, alleged
to be fostered by high tariff rates and the economic
distress resulting from the Panic of 1907, general dis-
satisfaction with the old methods of framing tariff
legislation developed. In 1907 the Merchants Association
of New York adopted a resolution favoring the creation
of a Tariff Commission "which shall take the tariff out
10
of politics and politics out of the tariff." A similar
resolution was adopted by the National Association of
10. Henry T. Wills, Scientific Tariff Making (New York:
Blanchard Press 1913) p. 17.
-1
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Manufacturers in 1908. Eventually, the agitation in the
business world brought forth tangible results. With the
enactment of the Payne -Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909,
authority was given to the President of the United
States to employ such persons as he considered necessary
to assist him in securing information in order to carry
out the maximum and minimum provisions of the new law.
Primarily for this purpose a Tariff Board composed of
three Republican members was appointed by President
Taft in 1909. In 1911, the President added two other
members, both Democrats, to the Board.
Such independent action on the part of the Presi-
dent resulted in the first signs of opposition by
certain members of Congress to the establishment of the
Tariff Board. This latter group maintained that the
framing of tariff measures was exclusively a legislative
function; and if the Tariff Board were established, it
should report directly to Congress instead of to the
Executive. President Taft, however, who was an ardent
advocate of a permanent Tariff Board or Commission, in-
sisted upon the experiment and was aided by public
opinion which had been further discouraged with the
results of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Law. Many attempts
were made by the President to effect cooperation be-
tween the Board and the opposition party in Congress,
*<
but they were of no avail. In spite of the hostility,
the work of the Board continued, and in 1911-1912 ex-
haustive investigations and reports were submitted to
the President concerning the pulp, woolen, and cotton
industries. In following a policy of invariably ac-
cepting the decisions of the Board, President Taft was
unwilling to sign tariff measures until the reports of
the Board were available as a basis for judgment. As
the preparation of the reports required careful inves-
tigation carried on by many experts in different parts
of the world, and as in the reports submitted, the Board
declined to frame recommendations in regard to future
legislation, there was a great deal of impatience with
its service. The Tariff Board was abolished on June
30, 1912 by the refusal of Congress to appropriate funds
for its maintenance.
Although the Tariff Board had encountered a poli-
tical fate similar to its two temporary predecessors,
it had, nevertheless, achieved something in the way of
providing a basis for the organization and policies of
the present Tariff Commission as well as being the
first successful effort to compile original data upon
which to base tariff action.
•i
(
39.
PRESENT TARIFF COMMISSION
As was mentioned previously, the cost of production
division was re-created in the Bureau of Foreign and
Domestic Commerce in 1912; however, the reports sub-
mitted by the division were of a limited nature and they
failed to provide any reliable information to Congress
as a basis for the writing of tariff bills.
In the meantime, violent changes in prices and
costs of production, as well as the general upheaval of
business throughout the world brought on by World War
I, made the determination of equitable tariff rates a
rather difficult matter. Both Congress and President
Wilson finally realized the need of reliable informa-
tion as a guide to the future tariff policies of the
government. As a result of the demand for an agency for
the purpose of ascertaining the truth in such matters,
President Wilson, on January 24, 1916, in a letter to
the Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee
urged the creation of a Tariff Commission:
"to provide the government with necessary data
to furnish sound basis for policy which should
be pursued in the years immediately ahead of
us, years which will no doubt be full of many
changes which it is impossible even for the
most prescient to forecast." 11
11. Bernhardt, op. cit . , p. 16.
- *
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ORGANIZATION, PURPOSE AND GENERAL POWERS
OP THE UNITED STATES TARIFF COMMISSION
The Revenue Act of 1916, which created the United
States Tariff Commission, contained several restrictions
upon its organization and activities. And since the
creation of the present Tariff Commission in 1916 there
has existed amongst Congressmen a difference of opinion
as to both the purpose and function of the body. The
difference of opinion has conveniently at times fluc-
tuated with the political views of whatever party
happens to be in power. From a study of the Congres-
sional records preceding the adoption of the present
Tariff Commission, it is evident that the original
intention of Congress was to simply create a special
agency for assisting its members in one of their more
intricate legislative problems. Some members of Con-
gress entertained the opinion that the Commission might
eventually be made a "non-partisan" customs arbitration
body which would operate in a manner similar to the
Interstate Commerce Commission.
Unfortunately, however, this plan was thwarted by
effective lobbyists who, through political pressure,
were successful in their attempts to elevate the newly
created Tariff Commission from a Congressional advisory
capacity to that of an administrative agency under
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Presidential discretion. This scheme was accomplished
by the stipulation in the law that the Commission should
function as an aid to the Chief Executive.
To insure the establishment of a non-partisan body
on the surface at least, the Act directed the Fresident
in making his appointments to the Commission to appoint
members of different political parties and not more than
three Commissioners could be of the same political
party.
The essential purpose of the United States Tariff
Commission is to aid Congress in all matters relating
to tariff legislation by supplying accurate and reliable
information. According to the first Chairman of the
Commission, Dr. P. W. Taussig,
"Our essential task then is to act as the servants
and assistants of Congress. We are to gather
and prepare information, to sift the essential
from the non-essential. We shall bend our ut-
most endeavors to be exhaustive in inquiry and
at the same time brief and discriminating in
statement. As regards advice, we must be spar-
ing, since advice must often rest on the basis
of established fundamental principles; and fun-
damental principles must be settled not by the
Commission, but by Congress and by the Public.
We have no Commission of a high flying sort." 12
12. Frank W. Taussig, Address delivered before the Home
Market Club, Boston, May 18, 1917.

42.
It is both by law and interpretation that the Com-
mission as originally created was purely a fact finding
body. Its function was not to fix rates; "to name
13
rates; or even suggest what rates were desirable; 11
but merely to aid Congress in determining rates.
"The Commission pursues many lines of investiga-
tion which may be divided fundamentally into
two classes: those which are conducted with
the definite end in view of aiding Congress or
the President in particular problems, and those
which are in the nature of a general research." 14
Shortly after its organization the Tariff Commission
was confronted with abnormal conditions due to the
entry of the United States into World Vfar I. During
the hostilities, the Commission's staff was extensively
engaged upon various duties and investigations con-
cerned with the prosecution of the war. In spite of
the pressure of wartime demands upon the Commission and
its staff, much was accomplished in anticipation of the
return of normalcy.
The work of the Commission developed along two
lines. Foremost were studies for the improvement of the
administrative features of customs legislation. The
second development under the Commission's general powers
1 13. Bernhardt, op.cit p. 24.
14. Ibid., p. 25.
(
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have been the "Tariff Information Surveys," which have
been provided for the various Congressional Committees
and the general public. These "Tariff Surveys" and
other publications edited by the Tariff Commission have
been the most valuable single function performed by the
Commission.
In accordance with the Revenue Act of 1916, the
Tariff Commission was authorized to investigate the fis-
cal and industrial effects of the Customs Law in force;
to determine the relationship between duties and raw
materials and finished or partly finished products; to
determine all questions relative to the arrangement of
schedules and classification of articles in the several
15
schedules of the Customs Laws; to investigate the
operation of the Customs Laws at to their effect upon
the industries and labor of the country; and to submit
reports of its findings to the Congressional Committees.
The Commission was further authorized to make a
complete study of the tariff relations of the United
States with foreign countries, as to commercial treaties,
economic alliances, the effect of export bounties,
preferential transportation rates, the volume of
15. Section 701, Revenue Act of 1916.
•1
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importation as compared with the domestic production
and consumption, and conditions, causes, and effects re-
lating to competition of foreign industries with those
of the United States, including dumping and cost of
16
production.
In order to assist the Commission in its investiga-
tions, the power to copy any document, paper, or record,
pertinent to the subject matter under investigation, to
summon witnesses, take testimony, administer oaths and
require the production of books and papers, was ex-
17
tended to the Commission^ staff. The power of the
courts was invoked to enforce this provision, with
18
punishment for contempt in case of failure to comply,
EXECUTIVE INFLUENCE OVER THE COMMISSION
The Revenue Act of 1916 awarded the power of ap-
pointing six Commissioners under a stagger system as
well as the authority of designating the Chairman and
Vice Chairman to the Chief Executive. As the plan was
originally conceived, it had the appearance of being
16. Section 704, Revenue Act of 1916.
17. Section 701, Revenue Act of 1916.
18. Ibid.
•*
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in harmony with the incumbent administration at least.
The six original Commissioners were Wilson appointees;
and regardless of their political affiliations, it is
evident that all of their views on the tariff were
similar in many respects to those of President Wilson
himself.
As far as Woodrow Wilson is concerned, he was
formerly a college professor and well educated in the
principles of economics. Although he recognized the
doctrine of comparative cost advantage and the values
of freer trade, he accepted protection as a practical
necessity for the immediate policy of the United States.
His views on the tariff are reflected in the following
statement
:
"Therefore we are to act upon the fundamental
principle of the Democratic party, not free
trade, but tariff for revenue, and we have
got to approach that by such stages and at
such a pace as will be consistent with the
stability and safety of the business of the
country. 19
Due to his preoccupation with the League of Nations
and his untimely death, President Wilson's influence
19. Phillip G. Wright, Tariff Making by Commission
(Rawleigh Tariff Bureau, Washington, D.C. 1930)
p. 17.
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over the Tariff Commission was limited to that of
appointments.
With the passage of the Tariff Act of 1922 the
general powers of investigation afforded the Commission
by the Revenue Act of 1916 were more or less omitted*
The introduction of the President's power to supervise
special investigations instigated the first major dif-
ficulty over the determination of the investigatory
rule of the Commission. The Tariff Act of 1922 stated
that:
"investigations to assist the President in as-
certaining differences in cost of production
under this section shall be made by the United
States Tariff Commission and no proclamation
shall be issued under this section until such
investigation shall have been made. The Com-
mission shall give reasonable public notice of
its hearings and shall give reasonable oppor-
tunity to be heard. The Commission is
authorized to adopt such reasonable procedure, 20
rules and regulations as it may deem necessary."
Concerning the interpretation of this part of the
law, the remaining Wilson appointees, Commissioners
Costigan, Lewis and Culbertson, disagreed with the newly
appointed "protectionist" Commissioners of the Harding
administration. The former members maintained that due
20. Section 315 (e), Tariff Act of 1922.
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to the statement that "the Commission is authorized to
adopt such reasonable procedure, rules and regulations
as it may deem necessary," and also the fact that from
its origin, the Commission has exercised its discretion
in conducting investigations, the President's role was
superfluous. They felt that the Commission still re-
tained the general powers of investigation it had under
the Revenue Act of 1916. It was at this point that the
trouble began which led to the President's final domin-
ance of the Commission's investigations.
When an application for an investigation of pig iror
was submitted, the three low tariff theorists (Wilson
appointees) commenced to investigate iron and steel
rates. At the same time the newly appointed Republican
Commissioners, Mr. Marvin and Mr. Burgess being a
minority, foresaw the possible results of reducing rates
in the well protected iron and steel interests. Their
fears were temporarily alleviated because in the
interim President Harding, who was vacationing in
Florida, received many complaints concerning the price
of sugar; therefore, he immediately ordered the Tariff
21
Commission to investigate the sugar situation. Pre-
21. Hearings before the Select Committee on Investiga-
tion of the Tariff Commission, U.S. Senate (Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington,D.C. ) Part IV,
pp. 275-278,
-
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viously, the President had followed a policy of leaving
the Commission free to exercise the discretionary role
of selecting its items for investigations, but his
action in the sugar case definitely marked the turning
point and ushered in a new policy of executive control
over the Commission's investigations.
Before the President returned to Washington from
his Florida vacation, he was frequently informed by
Commissioners Marvin and Burgess that the existing
majority on the Commission (Commissioners Costigan,
Culbertson and Lewis ) were acting rather hastily about
opening up investigations which had not been definitely
petitioned by domestic interests. On the other hand,
Mr. Culbertson, who had furnished Senator Harding with
advice and information on the tariff issue during the
1920 Presidential campaign, was continually urging
President Harding, via letter, to stand on his original
concept of the flexible tariff and leave the matter of
investigation to the Commission. As for the President,
he was experiencing a difficult problem and he had to
choose between the two alternatives. Actually, the
solution of the controversy was one of determining
whether he, the President, should put his weight on the
side of those interests which wanted to use the flexible
(
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provisions to reduce existing rates or with those
advocating further protection under such provisions.
In making his decision, the President took into con-
sideration two very important factors. First of all,
it wouldn't prove beneficial to the administration if
the entire tariff controversy was reopened after Con-
gress had spent two years of study and effort in framing
the new law, and secondly, there was a general public
impulse toward the high duties resulting from the post
war psychology of fear and excessive nationalism. In
addition, the President had been especially impressed
with the favorable response to his campaign speeches
when he spoke of protection. This fact was brought out
in a letter from him to Commissioner Culbertson, which
stated in part:
"I know you will be interested when I tell you
that at no time do I get a more enthusiastic
response from my auditors than when I revert
to the Republican policy of protecting the
American grade standard and the American stan-
dard of living for workers." 22
Finally, the President case his lot with the pro-
tectionist minority group in the Commission when, prior
to his return from Florida, he instructed the opposing
leaders, Mr. Burgess and Mr. Culbertson, that all fur-
22. Ibid
., p. 618.
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ther independent action by the Commission was suspended
until his return. Such direct action by the President
was another step toward the eventual subordination of
the independent role of the Commission to the Chief
Executive
.
The administration was further strengthened with
the appointment of new personnel to the Commission,
With the resignation of Dr. Page in March 1923, the
President appointed Henry H. Glassie, a Maryland Demo-
crat, to fill the vacancy. He also promoted Mr. Marvin
to the position of Chairman. As the Commission was then
constituted, it can be said that there were three "pro-
tectionists" as opposed to three "low tariff theorists."
The element of non-partisanship was fulfilled by an
equal division of the Commissioners between the two
major political parties. Nevertheless, with the chair-
manship in the hands of Mr. Marvin, an avowed protection-
ist, the President and the Republican administration
were satisfied as to the controlling power in future
23
investigations
•
When a decision on the sugar investigation had to
be rendered during the Coolidge administration, the
23. Ibid., pp. 271, 278, 281, 283, 66-663, and 892-894.
c
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President discovered himself in a rather embarrassing
situation. As usual, the Commission was divided con-
cerning the proposed sugar rates. In addition, Mr. H.
Glassie was officially disqualified by Congress from
participation in the case due to his affiliation with
Louisiana sugar interests. Thus, instead of a divided
opinion, the removal of Commissioner Glassie resulted
in the President's being faced with the majority report
of Commissioners Costigan, Culbertson, and Lewis,
recommending a reduction in sugar rates.
In order to prevent a repetition of a similar
situation the Chief Executive employed a bit of politi-
cal strategy. Commissioner Culbertson, who always
proclaimed himself as a Republican but who consistently
stood with those who favored moderation in tariff
rates, was politely "kicked upstairs" to the position
of Minister to Roumania.
When the term of office of David J. Lewis expired
on September 7, 1924, he was unanimously recommended
to President Coolidge for reappointment by all of his
fellow Commissioners and many others. Yet in the eyes
of the President he had been one of those who had
signed the majority report advocating a substantial
reduction in the sugar duty. In connection with the
COLLEGE OF LIBERAL ARlb
LIBRARY
V
52.
President's decision, a curious incident regarding Mr.
Lewis' reappointment is related in the annals of the
Senate Investigating Committee's report.
According to a letter sent "by Commissioner Culbert-
son to Commissioner Costigan, the former related to the
latter that in response to a telephone call he went to
the President's office. The President informed Commis-
sioner Culbertson that he intended to reappoint Mr. Lewis
but that he desired that Mr. Lewis prepare and give to
him a letter of resignation to be effective if at any
future time he (the President) desired to accept. On the
following day Mr. Lewis went to the President's office to
receive his Commission. When he entered, the President
had before him the Commission. The President requested,
as a condition of Mr. Lewis* reappointment, that he sign
an undated resignation which might be used at the
President's discretion. Mr. Lewis explained that he did
not feel free to furnish the President with the requested
resignation. According to Mr. Lewis, the President was
visibly disturbed and said with a little heat that it
did not make any difference anyway, that the position
would be held subject to the pleasure of the President.
Lewis then said to the President that only the two of
them knew that the Commission was signed and he suggested
that the President was at liberty to destroy it. The
1
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President, however, did not respond to this suggestion
and Lewis left the Presidents office with the Commission.
The Commission was, however, for a recess appointment
and it expired the following March, when the President
appointed a personal friend, Alfred P. Dennis, in Mr.
24
Lewis' place.
Undoubtedly, in appointing Commissioners, the
various Presidents have consulted not only their own
convictions, but even more so, those of the ever-present
interested groups intimately connected with the incumbent
administration. It is evident from what has been men-
tioned in the preceding paragraphs that the "business
interests" which have always made it a point to influence
the membersof Congress have successfully carried out to
a great degree the molding of the personnel of the United
States Tariff Commission.
24. Ibid., pp. 350-353.
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CHAPTER IV
THE GROWTH OF THE PRESIDENT'S AUTHORITY
OVER TARIFF MATTERS
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY
The division of government into three distinct
branches has been more or less accepted as a doctrine in-
dispensable to civil liberty. Even Aristotle in his
Politics stated "that in every state there are three
divisions; the general assembly deliberating upon public
1
affairs, a body of magistrates, and a judiciary."
Montesquieu, however, was the first one to introduce
the theory of the separation of powers as a fundamental
principle of our modern political science.
"When the legislative and executive powers are
united In the same person or body," says
Montesquieu, "there can be no liberty because
apprehensions might arise lest the same monarch
or senate should enact tyrannical laws to exe-
cute them In a tyrannical manner." 2
It is upon this doctrine that the American constitu-
tional system rests. The Constitution separates the
three major powers of government, assigning each to its
own department or division; thus it seeks to avert that
1. William Bondy, The Separation of Governmental Powers,
(Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, Colum-
bia University, 1896), Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 12.
2. Ibid., pp. 13-14.
a

threat to the liberties of the people which Montesquieu
and his followers "believed must result from a merger of
the three powers or any two of them in the same hands.
Prom the early days of our country, we have always
had the "strict constructionists" who have upheld the
doctrine of the rigid separation of powers. On the other
hand, we likewise have enjoyed the presence of the so
called "loose constructionists," who have propounded the
idea that "all powers requiring decision, and unity of
plan should be delegated to the executive."
The history of American Constitutional Law Is not
lacking in cases pertaining to the judicial solution of
the controversy between the two opposing factions. The
problem eventually confined itself to the question of the
constitutionality of the delegation of legislative power
to the executive.
The earliest case bearing upon the relation of the
delegation of legislative power of Congress to the execu-
tive was that of the United States v. Brig Aurora, which
arose out of the Non-Intercourse Act of 1809. The Act,
in forbidding trade with Great Britain and France, author
ized the President to suspend its provisions when, in his
judgment, certain events had taken place, and likewise to
revive them upon the occurrence of certain other events,
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of which also he was to be the judge. The Aurora was
seized for attempting to trade contrary to the provisions
of the Act after it had been revived by Presidential
proclamation. The counsel for the claimant argued: "To
make the revival of a law dependent upon the presidential
proclamation is to give that proclamation the force of a
law." "Congress cannot transfer the legislative power
to the Fresident."
The Court, nevertheless, upheld the government,
saying, "we see no sufficient reason why the legislature
should not exercise its discretion in reviving the Act of
1809, either expressly or conditionally as its judgment
3
should direct ."
The precedent thus established was followed in 1891
in the case of Field v. Clark, in which the point at issue
was the validity of a provision of the Tariff Act of 1890
empowering the President to suspend certain other provi-
sions of the Act in certain contingencies to be ascertaine
by him.
The Court cited an imposing list of similar provi-
sions from earlier statutes and of presidential proclama-
tions in pursuance thereof, and concluded that both on
3. Corwin, op.cit
. , pp. 116-117.
a

the basis of precedent and of principle the provision in
question was unassailable.
"That Congress cannot delegate legislative power
to the President," Justice Harlan asserted, "is
a principle universally recognized as vital to
the integrity and maintenance of the system of
government ordained by the Constitution, The Act
of October 1, 1890 is not inconsistent with
that principle. Nothing involving the expediency
or just operation of such legislation was left to
the determination of the President. Legislative
power was exercised when Congress declared that
the suspension should take effect upon a named
contingency. What the President was required to
do was simply in execution of the act of Con-
gress." 4
Evaluated by this test, subsequent Acts of Congress
in the same field have gone much further. By the Tariff
Act of 1922 the duty was imposed upon the President of
determining, with the aid of advisers, differences in
costs of production here and abroad, and of making in-
creases and decreases in the customs rates to equalize
such costs; and by the Tariff Act of 1930 he was author-
ized to raise or lower the rates set by the statute as
much as fifty percent. In Hampton v. United States, the
former provision was attacked on the ground that "the
difference in cost of production at home and abroad
cannot be found as a fact without using choice between
results at every stage, thus expressing exercise of the
4 » v * Clark , 143 United States 649.
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legislative will." The Court overruled the contention,
but in so doing Chief Justice Taft found it necessary to
supplement as well as clarify the reasoning in Field v.
Clark with precedents and arguments of a radically dif-
ferent tendency. He said in part:
"The rule is that in the actual administration of
the government, Congress or the legislature
should exercise the legislative power, the
President or the State Executive, the Governor,
the executive power, and the courts or the judi-
ciary the judicial power, and in carrying out
that constitutional division into three branches
it is a breach of the national fundamental law
if Congress gives up this legislative power and
transfers it to the President, or to the judicial
branch, or if by law it attempts to invest its
members with either executive power or judicial
power. .. .This is not to say that the three
branches are not coordinate parts of one govern-
ment and that each in the field of its duties may
not invoke the action of the other two branches
insofar as the action invoked shall not be an
assumption of the constitutional field of action
of another branch." 5
From the evidence presented in the above Court
excerpts it is obvious that there developed a tendency
toward the "loose constructionists" doctrine of the
separation of powers as well as a general acceptance of
the principle that legislative authority could be dele-
gated to the Executive in order to carry out a policy or
law within certain definite limits. Actually, the Con-
5. J.W. Hampton Jr. and Co. v. United States, 276 U.S.
394, 396-397.
-

stitution confers "all legislative powers" upon Congress
and prohibits that body from transferring legislative
powers to others. Yet the Constitution rests in the
hands of the President the execution and administration
of laws passed by Congress; thereby placing large dis-
cretionary powers with the Chief Executive for carrying
out a law once it had been enacted by Congress. The re-
sults of this policy according to recent practices of our
government have been for the legislative to make laws so
indefinite and vague that administrative authorities have
exercised unlimited discretion in executing their dele-
gated rights which are in many cases fundamentally legis-
lative in character.
PRESIDENT'S POWER TO CHANGE
CUSTOMS RATES
By the authority of Section 336 of the Tariff Act of
1930 (originally 315 of the Tariff Act of 1922) the
President is provided with the power to increase or de-
crease existing tariff rates up to fifty percent. The
wording of the statute is so arranged that it invariably
operated to the greater advantage of certain pressure
groups who were successful in influencing Congressmen
during the making of the two recent tariff acts to put
certain commodities or articles on an ad valorem or
compound basis. The proof of this lies in the fact that
**
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on specific rates the President is limited to a change of
fifty percent; but if the rates are an ad valorem basis,
the President may, by changing the norm of valuation from
the "foreign value" to the "American selling price"
greatly increase the amount of duty collectable than
otherwise would be received on a specific duty basis.
When the President changed the rate of duty on
"barium dioxide" from four cents a pount to six cents a
pound, J. W. Hampton, Jr. and Company challenged the
constitutionality of his action in the Courts. They
rested their case upon two grounds:
1) That section 315 of the Tariff Act of 1922 was
invalid because it constituted a delegation
to the President of legislative power which
according to Article I Section I of the Con-
stitution, is vested in the Congress.
2) That the section was void because according
to Article I Section 8 of the Constitution,
the power to lay and collect taxes, duties,
imports, and excises is vested in Congress,
not the President. 6
After the case had passed through the lower Courts,
the final outcome was a unanimous decision by the Supreme
Court declaring section 315 of the Tariff Act of 1922 to
be constitutional.
"The theory accepted by the Court in the Hampton
Case was that Congress is really acting through
6. J.W. Hampton Jr. and Co. v. United States , 276 U.S. 394.
-•
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the President. He is an agent acting within pre-
scribed limits. And any attempt on the part of
> the courts to control or regulate the President's
actions would be judicial interference with the
legislative process." 7
PRESIDENT'S POWER TO CHANGE CLASSIFICATIONS
With the President's authority to change customs
rates within definite limits being held constitutional it
wasn't long before he began exercising his rights, with
the favorable decision of the Hampton Case as support,
to make new classifications.
Paragraph 710 of the Tariff Act of 1922 reads as
follows: "Cheese and substitutes, therefore, 5 cents per
pound, but not less than 25 per centum ad valorem."
Actually, this compound rate covers approximately one
hundred and fifty different varieties of imported cheese.
When put into operation it was impossible for such a
compound duty to equalize the differences between the
foreign and domestic costs of each particular item. It
wasn't long, therefore, before an investigation of the
U. S. Tariff Commission revealed that Swiss cheese was
selling at a higher price than a similar domestic cheese.
Upon receiving the report of the Commission, the Presi-
7. Larkin, op. cit
. , p. 36.

dent changed the classification to read: "Cheese by
whatever name known, having the eye formation characteris-
tic of the Swiss or Emmenthaler type, 7J- cents per
pound, but not less than 37^- per centum ad valorem."
The Pox River Butter Company immediately challenged the
increase in duty primarily on the grounds that it was
unconstitutional for the President to change a classifi-
cation by means of inserting an entirely new paragraph
8
in the law.
The Customs Court held the Tariff Act unconstitu-
tional, but this decision was later reversed by the Court
9
of Customs and Patent Appeals. A petition by the
former Court for a "writ of certiorari" from the Supreme
Court to review the action of the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals was denied. It is worth mentioning here
that a legal maxim says: "The denial of a !writ of
certiorari 1 imports no expression of opinion upon the
merits of the case, as the bar has been told many
10
times .
"
8. Fox River Butter Co . v. United States (TD 44667)
Treasury Reports, February 24, 1931.
9. United States v. Fox River Butter Co . (TD 45675)
Advance Reports C.C.R.A. May 2, 1932.
10. United States v. Carver , 260 U.S. 482, 490.
t
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In sanctioning the "Swiss Cheese" case, the Supreme
Court was consistent with its policy laid down in the
"barium dioxide" litigation. In brief, this last men-
tioned liberal interpretation of the Court heartily en-
dorsed the right of the President to change the wording
of a statute. To consider such Presidential action as
being constitutional is putting the stamp of approval of
the highest Court in the land on a function (i.e., the
writing of a law) which has never been regarded as a pre-
rogative of the Executive branch of our government.
PRESIDENT'S POY/ER TO CHANGE VALUATION
Section 336 of the Tariff Act of 1930 states in part
that if the (tariff) Commission finds through investiga-
tion that differences in costs of production cannot be
equalized by changing the rate 50 percent, it shall make
the matter known in its report to the President and shall
specify therein such necessary ad valorem rates of duty
based upon the American selling price (which is defined
in section 402(g) of the Act). In no case shall the
total decrease of such rates of duty exceed 50 percentum
of the rates expressly fixed by statute, and no such rate
11
shall be increased.
11. Section 336, Tariff Act of 1930.

As was mentioned earlier in the section concerning
the President 's power over customs rates, the general
impression created by the flexible provisions of the two
recent tariff acts is that tariff duties cannot be
altered by more than the stipulated amount of 50 percent.
Actually, however, the President may, by transferring the
basis of valuation from the "foreign market value" to the
"American selling price" materially increase the amount
of duty collectable. Thus, by changing the valuation
without necessarily increasing the rate, the amount of
duty assessed can legally exceed the supposed limit of
50 percent.
In order to illustrate the extent of the President's
power in such a situation the following examples are
submitted.
In the Tariff Commission's Report concerning its
investigation of "Rag Rugs" (hit and miss type) it was
recommended that in order to equalize the difference be-
tween foreign and domestic costs of the rugs, the domestic
12
valuation plan should be used.
12. U.S. Tariff Commission, Rag Rugs (Government Printing
Office, Washington, 1928) pp. 24-25.
1
Rates of duty Rag Rugs, "hit and miss"
Act of 1922 stipulated 35% of the foreign
value .
President's proclamation, 35v£ of the American
selling price .
The corresponding ad valorem duties are:
Value per sq. yd . Amount of
duty collected
1) Foreign value 25. 5tf x .35 equals 9.97^
2) American selling price 61.7/ x .35 equals 21.59^
As the above figures indicated, the President legally
altered the amount of duty per square yard more than 100$
13
without changing the rate.
In another case involving imported taximeters, the
Tariff Act of 1922 provided a compound duty which in-
14
eluded a 45 percent ad valorem rate. After the Tariff
Commission's investigation, the President proclaimed a
reduction in the ad valorem rate to 27.1 percent and
simultaneously changed the basis of valuation from the
15
"foreign value" to the "American selling price." On
the surface there was a decrease in the rate of duty, but
13. Ibid .
14. U.S. Tariff Commission, Taximeters (Government Print-
ing Office, Washington, 1928), p. 31.
15. Ibid., p. 47.
tod
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the net effect of the changed basis of valuation was an
increase of 115 percent in the amount of duty collected.
The term "American Selling Price" is determined by
the price of an article manufactured or produced in the
United States and possessing very similar characteristics
to the one imported.
There are, of course, limits to the American selling
price, but they are not comparable to the legislative
limits fixed by statute. In short, the so-called flexi-
ble or scientific plan which was alleged to have pre-
scribed definite rules for equalizing foreign and
domestic costs provided, instead, wide administrative
powers in the hands of the President.
THE USE OF EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS
UNDER THE RECIPROCAL TRADE PROGRAM
With the passage of the Trade Agreements Act in
1934 the previous growth of Presidential authority over
tariff policy was continued through the medium of Execu-
tive Agreements. The right of the Executive to enter
into binding Executive Agreements without the necessity
of subsequent Senate approval has been confirmed by long
usage. Ever since the adoption of the Constitution,
binding Executive Agreements have been concluded by the
President with other nations. The validity of such

agreements has never been seriously questioned by the
courts
.
The previously mentioned failure of the Kasson trade
treaties is indicative of the unsuccessful attempts of
reciprocity treaties requiring Senate ratification. On
the other hand, under the McKinley Tariff Act of 1890
thirteen executive trade agreements were negotiated and
twelve became effective. Under Section 3 of the Dingley
Tariff Act of 1897, which, unlike Section 4, authorized
the conclusion of trade agreements without Senate con-
16
currence, fifteen executive agreements were successfully
concluded with eight countries.
As stated by the U.S. Tariff Commission in 1933, in
its study summarizing our experience in this matter:
"The past experience of the United States with
respect to the difficulty of obtaining reciprocal
tariff concessions by means of treaties and the
greater success in negotiating Executive Agree-
ments under previous authorization by the Congress
may be significant as a guide to future policy
regarding methods of tariff bargaining." 17
Accordingly, when in 1933 we faced the problem of
16. For explanation of term see section on Executive
Agreements (Chapter II).
17. U.S. Tariff Commission, Tariff Bargaining Under Most
Favored Nation Treaties ( Government Printing Office,
Washington, 1934), p. 62.
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what method to pursue in the task of bargaining down
trade barriers with foreign nations, the answer seemed
clear. The Trade Agreements Program is based upon the
principle of tariff adjustment through executive agree-
ments.
In passing the law, Congress, in order to guard
against the furtherance of administrative and beaucratic
powers, provided the following limitations upon Presi-
dential authority:
1) The limitation that no article can be trans-
ferred between the dutiable and free lists.
2) The limitation that no proclamation shall be
made increasing or decreasing by more than
b0% any existing rate of duty.
3) Public Notice of the intention to negotiate
an agreement in order that any interested
person may have an opportunity to present
his views to the President, or to such agency
as the President may designate, under such
rules and regulations as the President may
prescribe. 18
In spite of the above listed limitations, the
language (partly stated above) of the Reciprocal Trade
Act of 1934, still provides the President with a certain
amount of arbitrary discretion in allowing the Chief
Executive to make his own rules and regulations and to
18. William S. Culbertson, Reciprocity (New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Co. Inc. (pp. 107-108.

designate whomever he pleases to hold the hearing. In
line with this thought, the following testimony of Mr.
Francis B. Sayre, one time Assistant Secretary of State,
reflects the recognition of continued Presidential control
over tariff policy;
"The yard stick there again is the discretion of
the President. Congress ha3 realized that, to
obtain results, it must leave to him the exercise
of those powers subject to a yard stick which
must be indefinable. It must rely on his discre-
tion." 19
Thus, as our tariff policy exists today, it has
continued a national policy which began in 1921; namely,
the attempt at the "scientific" administration of the
tariff by administrative rather than Congressional action.
POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS
Under the existing tariff law, the President is
relatively free to carry out any policy of his own
choosing. Not only in the matter of appointing Commis-
sioners (which was discussed in Chapter III), but also
on the question deciding upon the Tariff Commission^
Reports and recommendations, the President has the final
word. Since 1930, the President has been limited by
section 336, which requires an investigation and recom-
19. Ibid ., p. 108.
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mendation by the Tariff Commission before the President
can act; nevertheless, the lav; says nothing about the
Chief Executive being bound to accept the Commission's
recommendations. Legally, the President holds the
supreme authority to disregard or accept any recommenda-
tions, authorized or not, in altering or fixing Customs
rates. Section 336 of the Tariff Act of 1930 states:
"The President shall approve the rates and changes
in classification, if in his judgment such rates
of duty and changes are showiby such investigation
of the Commission to be necessary to equalize
such differences in costs of production." 20
Under such an arrangement, the President is provided
with the necessary authority to shift his tariff policies
at will, to manipulate tariff rates to his own liking,
and by both processes, to generate political favor to the
administration, interested groups, individuals, or himself
In connection with the political significance of Presi-
dential authority over tariff matters, the following
incident is related:
As the Congressional election of 1926 was approach-
ing, there was much apprehension in official circles over
the possible election results in the States of Washington
and Oregon. The producers of "red cedar shingles" were
clamoring for further protection from the imports from
20. Section 336(c), Tariff Act of 1930.
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British Colombia. The party in power was facing the loss
of congressional seats unless this element could be
appeased. At the same time, a much larger element
throughout the country was militantly opposed to any
further increase in the duty on shingles. The Tariff
Commission's preliminary survey Indicated that so far as
variations in production costs were concerned there was
little or none between British Colombia, and Washington
and Oregon. Nevertheless, at a very appropriate time
the Commission received word from the White House that a
thorough investigation of the comparative costs of
cedar shingles should be instituted, and that the report
would not be expected by the President until after the
first week in November. On its face such a request was
quite ominous. The Commission's experts proceeded to
the Northwest and began one of the most thoroughgoing
and exhaustive investigations yet undertaken. And while
they investigated, the party's spokesman made political
capital of the incident. The cedar shingle industry
of Washington and Oregon was reassured of the genuine
interest of the party and felt safe in supporting it at
the polls. But when the smoke screen of the campaign
had risen the Commission's report was made public. It
recommended no increases in the duty on shingles. But

the President was able to carry on for another two years
with the assured backing of a majority of his own party
21
in both houses of Congress,
21, Larkin, op. cit
. , pp. 58-59.
(
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CHAPTER V
THE FLEXIBLE TARIFF
SECTION 315
The flexible section 315 of the Tariff Act of 1922
had no antecedent in American tariff legislation. When
the Act of 1922 was approved by Congress> the flexible
section was claimed to be the device whereby the tariff
would be taken out of politics and made scientific.
With such optimistic assumptions accompanying the intro-
duction of the flexible section, and with such a pro-
nouncement to a country and world confused in almost
every phase of its economic life, the establishment and
administration of section 315 became of paramount
interest. For the first time in history the President
was authorized to raise or lower the tariff rates in
order to equalize foreign and domestic costs of produc-
tion. On paper at least, the Act provided for flexibility
in the full sense of the word.
In one subdivision of the section, a provision was
made for change to the American valuation basis if the
maximum duty increases provided for on the prevailing
foreign valuation basis did not accomplish equalization
<
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of foreign and domestic costs of production. Thus, the
entire problem of valuation became interwoven with the
flexible arrangement. A consideration of that problem
should logically precede an examination of the other pro-
visions of the section.
THE PROBLEM OF VALUATION
In determining the origin of the American valuation
concept, it is of historical significance to discover
that its initial appearance was in the very first Tariff
Act passed by Congress. As set down in the Act of 1789,
a 5% ad valorem duty was levied on miscellaneous mer-
chandise at the time and place of importation. This
dutiable value was to be arrived at by adding 20/5 to the
actual cost thereof, if the imports originated at the
Cape of Good Hope, or beyond, and 10fo if they came from
1
any other place in the country.
In 1795, Congress terminated the six year operation
of the American valuation plan by stipulating in the Act
of 1795 that the dutiable basis for ad valorem rates
2
would be "the actual cost at the place of exportation."
1. U.S. Tariff Commission, Dictionary of Tariff Informa
tion (Government Printing Office,Washington, 1923),
p7~S82.
2. Ibid., p. 282.
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This new foreign valuation plan remained in operation
until the passage of the Act of 1833, which stated that
duties were to be assessed upon the value thereof at the
port where they were entered. This return to the
American valuation concept did not "become effective until
June 10, 1842, because the Act of 1833 had extended the
life of the Act of 1832 until that date. The American
plan remained in effect for only two months, as the Act
of August 30, 1842, provided that duties were to be
levied upon the actual market value or wholesale price
at the time when purchased in the principal markets of
the country from which they were imported into the United
3
States.
Upon numerous occasions since the passage of this
latter Act, especially in 1909, 1913, 1920, and 1921,
unsuccessful attempts have been made to change the
foreign valuation basis to the American plan. History
reveals that prior to the tariff revision that took place
from 1921 to 1922, American valuation had been in oper-
ation for only two months (June - August 1842) in the
nineteenth century and to a limited degree during the
six years in the eighteenth century.
3. House Documents 61st Congress, 2nd Session, Vol.129,
pp.110 and 135.
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During the first two months of 1921, the Committee
of Ways and Means of the House held hearings upon prospec-
tive changes in the existing tariff law. Amongst the
more important problems that arose was the question of
American valuation. The plan to introduce into the new
tariff law the "American selling price" concept as the
basis for the valuation of imports was attacked by some
and supported by others.
Those in opposition to the change from the "foreign
value" to the American Valuation plan maintained that it
would mean the discarding of over a hundred years* ac-
cumulation of customs data and Court decisions and in-
terpretations, all of which were based upon the foreign
valuation system. They argued that it would place the
tariff in the hands of the business interests in the
country who could conceivably regulate production at
home, thereby determine prices which, in turn, would
serve as the dutiable basis of the American valuation
4
system.
Furthermore, it was held that the plan would result
in importers attempting to manipulate the domestic
market between the date of their purchases abroad and the
4. Hearings on General Tariff Revision before the
Committee on Wavs and Means, 66th Congress, 3rd Session,
Ft. IV, p. 4182.
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date of the arrival of the goods in the United States. A
situation was depicted wherein the importer might enter
goods into Canada, for example, and then place in a
bonded warehouse with subsequent withdrawal and exporta-
tion to the United States when the current selling price
5
was depressed here. It was further pointed out that
under American valuation, future buying would be prac-
tically rendered impossible, since the amount of duty
payable at the future date of importation could only be
roughly approximated at the time the future contracts
6
were entered into.
The argument that American valuation would effec-
tively deal with the problem of depreciated foreign ex-
changes was discounted by those opposed to the plan.
They balanced this point by declaring that price levels
abroad had risen by approximately the same amount that
exchange rates had fallen; therefore, the continued use
of foreign valuation would not decrease the amount of
7
duty revenue for that reason.
The final objection was made on the grounds that it
5. Ibid., p. 4208.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid
., p. 4209.
•{
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would be impossible, In every case, to find a comparable
and competitive American product. If none could be found
then, presumably, the foreign value would be taken and
worked back to the United States by adding transportation
charges, commissions, profits, and incidentals in order
to find the dutiable value. Such a procedure, it was
claimed, would involve much more work than the use of the
8
foreign valuation basis.
Those public officials in support of the plan be-
lieved that although a change from foreign to American
valuation would require considerable adjustment of gov-
9
ernment machinery, the task was not impossible.
Furthermore, it was felt that American valuation was
the best way to render undervaluations impossible, so
that the government would receive all the revenue in-
10
tended for it under the terms of any tariff measure.
Also, in adopting this plan, countries with higher pro-
duction costs would not be discriminated against, such as
11
was the case when foreign valuation was used.
Next it was pointed out that in our first Tariff Act
8. Ibid
., pp. 4210-4236.
9. Ibid ., pp. 4260-4271.
10. Ibid .
11. Ibid ., pp. 4277-4278.
•• *
•
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there was a provision for domestic valuation, but that,
at that time, wi th manufacturing but slightly developed
in this country, difficulty was naturally experienced in
establishing the American value of many of the imported
articles. It was maintained that this situation had
changed, and that most imports now were of such character
that their value in the American market was easily ascer-
12
tainable.
A final argument advanced in favor of the plan was
to the effect that whenever monopoly conditions of produc-
tion might prevail in the United States which would give
the producer the power to set prices, and so the duty,
this could be met by placing a specific duty upon imports
13
of such commodities.
A short time after the conclusion of the House
hearings, the chairman of the Ways and Means Committee
called upon the Tariff Commission to make any suggestions
or proposals it might see fit, with regard to contem-
plated legislation providing for the assessing of ad
valorem duties on American valuation. In the subsequently
submitted report, the Commission did not express any
12. Ibid
., p. 4281.
13. Ibid.
-i
80.
opinion concerning the adoption of the proposed change,
but it did evaluate the relative merits of both sides of
the issue.
Foremost, the Commission cited the difficulty of
determining the foreign value, especially of those
articles primarily designed for exportation. Furthermore,
attention was called to the difficulty and often the im-
possibility of securing foreign costs. Such diffi-
culties, along with the inherent problems arising from
invoice prices, instability of exchange rates, and dif-
ferences in the cost of production in foreign countries,
resulted in the Commission's advocating the abandonment
14
of foreign sources of valuation.
The report concluded that the Commission fully re-
alized the expense and difficulties involved in changing
a Customs system which had been in operation for the past
one hundred years. But it was also held that "this
would naturally be true of any substantial change in the
15
appraisal system."
With the testimony of the Hearings as well as the
Tariff Commission's Report as guides, the Ways and Means
14. U.S. Tariff Commission, American Valuation( Government
Printing Office, Washington, 1921), p. 5.
15. Ibid., pp.6, 58.
* •
4
Committee wrote Section 402 providing for a complete
change to the American valuation basis. The Bill passed
the House on July 21, 1921, minus any alterations in the
valuation section as originally drafted by the Committee.
Hearings on the House bill were begun by the
Senate Finance Committee on July 25, 1921 and were con-
ducted January 9, 1922. The arguments heard were largely
those given in the hearings before the House Committee,
slightly different in wording but essentially the same
in contents.
In addition to the testimony, four amendments to the
Tariff Bill were submitted to the Finance Committee by
Mr. Smoot of Utah. Two of them, to quote Mr. Smoot f s
words: "provide for the so-called American valuation in a
16
different form from that provided in the House Bill."
When the Committee eventually submitted the revised House
Bill to the Senate, the influence of Mr. Smoot ! s amend-
ments was visibly evident.
In brief, the Smoot amendments as incorporated into
the Finance Committee's revised House bill, provided in
section 315 that if any rate contained in the Act was
16. 62 Congressional Record, 67th Congress, 2nd Session,
Part I, p. 36.

found not to equalize conditions of competition here and
abroad, the President, after an investigation, was to
have the power to change the dutiable base to the
"American selling price" provided he did not, in addition
change the rate in the Act by more than 50 percent in
either direction. Underlying this new bill was President
Harding* s appeal in December, 1921, for a flexible
tariff to deal with changing economic conditions without
waiting for Congress to act.
With the exception of minor changes in wording, the
Finance Committee's revised House bill, v/hich included
the Smoot provisions for "American valuation", was
finally passed by the Senate in September, 1922, and
three days later the President signed the bill.
The Tariff Act of 1922, therefore, provided definite
encouragement to those advocating the adoption of the
American valuation plan. In paragraphs 27 and 28 of the
finally enacted bill, the "American selling price" is
to be and has been the basis used, at all times, for the
assessment of duties upon the exhaustive list of coal tar
products there enumerated. And in section 315 (336 of
Tariff Act of 1930) the "American selling price" can be
adopted by the President as the dutiable base in all
cases where he determines that an increase of 50 percent
on the foreign value will not equalize costs of produc-

tion in the United States and the principal competing
foreign country. This latter provision makes potential,
at least, the ultimate application of the American
valuation plan to all imports dutiable in whole or in
part upon their value under the conditions specified in
the section.
The question of American valuation in the tariff re-
vision of 1929-1930 received, relatively, less consider-
ation than was the case in 1921-1922, and yet it lost none
of the ground gained in the 1922 Act. Insofar as American
valuation is concerned, the wording of sections 336 and
402 of the Hawley Smoot Act are somewhat different from
the comparable sections in the Tariff Act of 1922; never-
theless, the essential features governing valuation are
fundamentally the same.
THE DEMAND FOR A SCIENTIFIC TARIFF
Post World War I conditions involved among other
things depreciated currencies and a general chaos in the
industries of Europe. Some of these industries were dor-
mant while others had been overstimulated by war demands.
No reliable data were available for determining whether a
given rate was "right" and if "right" today whether it
would be right tomorrow. In the belief that an adequate
rate should exist that would apply at all times and under
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all conditions, the ideas of a flexible tariff developed.
The concept of flexibility was first brought to
public attention by President Harding in his message on
December 6, 1921. His opinion of the problem was as
follows:
"I hope a way will be found to make for flexibility
and elasticity, so that rates may be adjusted to
meet unusual and changing conditions which cannot
be accurately anticipated. I know of no manner in
which to effect this flexibility other than the
extension of the powers of the Tariff Commission,
so that it can adapt itself to a scientific and
wholly just administration of the law*
"I am not unmindful of the constitutional difficul-
ties. These can be met by giving authority to the
Chief Executive, who could proclaim additional
duties to meet conditions which the Congress may
designate.
"The grant of authority to proclaim would necessarily
bring the Tariff Commission into new and enlarged
activities, because no Executive could discharge
such a duty except upon the information acquired and
recommendations made by this Commission. But the
plan is feasible, and the proper functioning of the
board would give us a better administration of a
defined policy than ever can be made possible by
tariff duties prescribed without flexibility.
"In this proposed flexibility, authorizing increases
to meet conditions so likely to change, there
should also be a provision for decreases. A rate
may be just today and entirely out of proportion
six months from today. If our tariffs are to be
made equitable, and not necessarily burden our
imports and hinder our trade abroad, frequent ad-
justments will be necessary for years to come.
Knowing the impossibility of modification by act
of Congress for anyone or a score of lines without
involving a long array of schedules, I think we
shall go a long way towards stabilization, if

there is recognition of the Tariff Commission's
fitness to recommend urgent changes by proclama-
tion." 17
In the above words, the President boldly faced the
crux of the problem; namely, the demand for some kind of
a scientific or flexible tariff which would be capable
of adjusting tariff duties to the constantly fluctuating
economic conditions so prevalent during the post war
periods. A flexible tariff seemed to be the only answer
unless Congress would be willing to undertake the time
consuming process of frequent tariff revisions until such
time as world economic stability was recovered.
With respect to the flexible tariff concept, both
major political parties were in general agreement as to
the principle on which a rate should be based. The prin-
ciple Itself is that a domestic producer shall not be at
a disadvantage in meeting foreign competition; and it
seemed to the Republicans that this end could not be ob-
tained by adding a sufficient duty to the foreign cost
of production to make it equal to the domestic cost of
production.
17. U.S. Tariff Commission, Sixth Annual Report (Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, 1922) pp. 1-2.
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COST OF PRODUCTION
According to the late Professor F. V/. Taussig, the
principle of having tariff rates equalize differences in
foreign and domestic costs was originally advocated by
the Republican Party platform of 1904 which stated that
"the measure of protection should always at least equal
18
the difference in cost of production at home and abroad."
This concept was finally realized with the passage of the
Tariff Act of 1909 which provided the President with
authority to "employ such persons as may be required" to
secure the necessary information for determining whether
other countries were discriminating against the commerce
of the United States. In accordance with this measure,
we noted earlier that President Taft created the Tariff
Board whose duty it was to furnish comparative cost data
for political authorities.
That the Board did furnish the President with some
information on this subject is evidenced by the following
letter written by President Taft from Beverly, Mass.,
August 20, 1910, to the Chairman of the National Congres-
sional Committee;
18. Frank W. Taussig, The Tariff History of the United
States (G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York and London,
1888) 8th edition, p. 363.
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"The difficulty in fixing the proper tariff rates
in accord with the principle stated in the Re-
publican platform is in securing reliable evidence
as to the difference between the cost of produc-
tion at home and the cost of production abroad
•
The bias of the manufacturer seeking protection
and of the importer opposing it weakens the
weight of their testimony. Moreover, when we
understand that the cost of production varies
in one country abroad from that in another and
that it changes from year to year and from month
to month, we must realize that the precise dif-
ference in cost of production sought for is not
capable of definite ascertainment and that all
that even the most scientific person can do in
his investigation is, after consideration of many
facts which he learns, to exercise his best judg-
ment in reaching a conclusion." 19
Briefly, President Taft implies in the above letter
that the "cost of production" clause of Section 315 is
of limited value due to its inherent difficulties; never-
theless, the use of the "cost of production" principle
has remained. In fact, as was noted in the third
chapter, after the elimination of the Tariff Board by
the Democrats in 1912, they retained the cost of produc-
tion division in the Department of Commerce. With the
establishment of the present Tariff Commission the cost
of production division was transferred to the Commission
where it now exists. As a matter of fact, one of the
principle functions of the Tariff Commission is the inves-
tigations concerning comparative production costs.
19. Larkin, op. cit
. , p. 70
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One may ask whether differences in the cost of pro-
duction between nations is a justifiable standard for
levying tariff rates? Professor P. W. Taussig maintains
that -
"as a solution of the tariff question, this much
paraded true principle is worthless; and if
applied with consistency, it would lead to the
complete annihilation of foreign trade. If the
duty is made high enough - and on this principle
you must make the duty high enough - almost
everything in the world can be produced in the
United States." 20
Of course, many advocates of the "equalizing rate"
principle maintain that it shouldn't be carried to such
extremes; whereas the more ardent proponents such as the
former Senator Aldrich of Montana hold that -
"if it costs ten cents to produce a razor in
Germany and twenty cents in the United States,
it will require a 100 percent duty to equalize
the conditions in the two countries ... .As far
as I am concerned, I shall have no hesitancy
in voting for a duty which will equalize condi-
tions.... If it were necessary to equalize the
conditions and to give the American producer a
fair chance for competition, other things being
equal of course, I would vote for a three hundred^,
percent duty as cheerfully as I would for fifty."
Professor Taussig's answer to the above theory is
that "the government would give the domestic producer all
he needs for equalization. . .and the necessary consequence
20. Prank W. Taussig, Free Trade, the Tariff and Recipro<
city (New York, The Macmillan Co., 1920) p. 136.
21. Ibid., p.

22
is universal and unlimited protection."
The problem of cost, however, is one of those diffi-
cult matters of investigation, none of whose factors are
constant. Money cost is only one of the determinants of
production, and production, in turn, is a determinant of
money costs. A certain amount of a commodity can fre-
quently "be produced at a given unit cost, but to double
the production would largely increase the unit cost.
Neither of these factors, the amount produced, or the
cost, is constant with respect to the other. Since the
varying factors of cost and production so intimately
react one upon the other, production influencing cost
and cost influencing production, one cannot strictly
speak of cost of production as one would speak, for
example, of the heating units of a grade of coal, or the
nutritive value of various foods. One can as well speak
of the production cost (i.e., quantity produced at a spe-
cified cost) as of the cost of production. Since there
are two interworking factors, therefore, both cost and
production, and not one factor constant with respect to
the other, the proper object of study may be said to be
cost and production rather than strictly cost of produc-
22. Ibid ., p. 137
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tion.
Production of goods and services in international
^ trade must be studied in its relation to natural re-
sources, labor supply, labor efficiency, social and
sanitary conditions, and these related in turn to money
costs. Costs under various conditions and extensions of
the industry and with respect especially to prices,
should be investigated and related, in turn, to the more
technical and social factors of production.
With the passage of the Tariff Act of 1922, the
general consensus of opinion was that at last we had a
real scientific tariff to solve the frequent and cum-
bersome problems inherent in tariff revision. Our
legislatures had framed what seemed at first to be an
ideal solution. However, with the passing of time the
task of interpreting the vague language of section 315,
as well as the practical application of the things to be
taken into consideration, posed insurmountable adminis-
trative difficulties to the Tariff Commission. In the
following chapter we shall discuss in detail the admin-
istrative problems encountered in the Tariff Commission^
attempt to apply the provisions of section 315 to indi-
> vidual commodity investigations.
23. Dictionary of Tariff Information, United States
Tariff Commission, (Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 1924) pp. 188-189.

RESULTS OF TEE FLEXIBLE TARIFF
When the Tariff Act of 1922 was passed, the expecta-
tion was that the flexible provision would be used to
lower rates rather than increase them. The unsettled
conditions of Europe made American producers unusually
apprehensive of destructive competition; hence the effort
had been to be on the safe side and make the rate too
high rather than too low. During the progress of the
debate on the flexible provision, Senator Smoot had
said:
,f If the President is given this power I think there
will be many, many more occasions when he will
exercise it in lowering rates than in raising
them; in fact, if the conditions became normal,
I expect the President of the United States to
lower, I was going to say, the majority of the
rates." 24
Even President Harding himself, the prime mover for
a flexible tariff , looked forward to a reduction of rates
as well as increases. I repeat in part what he said in
his message to Congress on December 6, 1921:
"In this proposed flexibility, authorizing in-
creases to meet conditions so likely to change,
there should also be provisions for decreases." 25
The records show that the results of the flexible
24, 62 Congressional Record, 67th Congress, August 10,
1922, pp. 11192-11193.
25. U.S. Tariff Commission, Sixth Annual Report , op. cit . ,p.2
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tariff have been entirely different from those desires
for low rates expressed above. In the twelfth annual
report of the United States Tariff Commission published
in 1928, it was stated that out of the 28 commodities on
which action had been taken by the Commission, all but
five had been granted substantial increases in the rates
of duty - the increase in all but four cases attaining
the limit of 50 percent. The articles receiving an in-
crease included such important commodities as wheat,
flour, straw hats, butter, and pig iron.
The articles receiving a decrease were relatively
unimportant. They were mill feeds, bobwhite quail,
26
paint brush handles, cresylic acid, and phenol.
Despite the disappointing results of the operation
of section 315, the idea of a scientific tariff was con-
tinued in section 336 of the Tariff Act of 1930.
In the seventeen months following the passage of the
1930 Tariff Act, thirty-seven reports were handed to the
President by the Tariff Commission, which is but one
fewer than the number handed him in the eight years dur-
ing which section 315 was in effect.
26. U.S. Tariff Commission, Twelfth Annual Report
(Government Printing Office, Washington, 1928),
pp. 1-2.

Such increased results can be accounted for in part
by the facility gained by the Commission in the adminis-
tration of section 315. Of the thirty-seven reports
submitted to the President up to the end of November,
1931, he has proclaimed duty increases as recommended by
the Commission in five cases, and duty decreases in
eleven cases. In seventeen cases he has agreed to the
Commission^ finding that no duty changes were necessary.
In the remaining four cases, two provided for decreases
in part, no change for the rest; one for a decrease in
part; an increase in part, and no change for the remain-
der; and one for an increase in part and no change in
27
the rest.
In spite of the changes made in section 336 and the
subsequent relative increase in the number of Presidential
proclamations flowing from the section, the same under-
lying weakness continues to prevail in the flexible pro-
visions. It is true that in the Commission^ reports
submitted to the President since the passage of the Tariff
Act of 1930, he hasn't possessed the pov/er to proclaim
any change other than the one recommended by the Commis-
27. U.S. Tariff Commission, Fifteenth Annual Report
(Government Printing Office, Washington, 1931),
pp. 91-96.

sion; nevertheless, he continues to hold the balance of
power.
In the light of what was mentioned in the second
chapter concerning political incidents and influence over
the Tariff Commission, it would be naive on our part if
we were to believe that politics have ever been removed
from Tariff. Instead of taking the tariff out of
politics, history shows that the effect of section 315
was to inject politics into the tariff.
So far, we have seen how the flexible provision
operates for the benefit of certain groups by automati-
cally tending towards higher rates by virtue of the
wording of the law.
Therefore, the conclusion is inevitable that the
flexible provisions in United States tariff policy have
not provided a tariff making arrangement that is either
free from politics or scientific. The overall result
has been the placing of increased control over the ad-
ministration of the United States Tariff in the hands of
a few rather than under the jurisdiction of Congress
where it rightly belongs.
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CHAPTER VI
ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS IN ADJUSTING-
TARIFF RATES
It is only natural to assume that in the adminis-
tration of laws, difficulties will be encountered. The
operation of Section 315 proved to be no exception in
these respects, and several fundamental difficulties were
experienced at an early date. Like any law, the Tariff
Act of 1922 was by no means a perfect piece of lesigla-
tion; in fact, there were no previous precedents to guide
Congress in the framing of that legislation which de-
veloped around the "equalizing rate principle."
Of the numerous administrative problems encountered
in the investigations, the Tariff Commission saw fit to
classify these individual problems. The most recent
classification, which is published in the Thirteenth
Annual Report of the United States Tariff Commission, is
as follows:
a) Determining the principal competing country.
b) Securing domestic and foreign costs of produc-
tion.
c) Determining the comparability of domestic and
foreign costs.

96,
d) Determining the principal market or markets in
the United States where such costs were to he
equalized.
e) Transportation costs.
In addition to the relative merits of the "equaliz-
ing rate principle" there still exists the classified
problems which have confronted the smooth functioning of
the administrative tariff machinery. I shall now attempt
to analyze those administrative problems in detail,
placing special emphasis upon specific investigations.
DETERMINING TEE PRINCIPAL COMPETING COUNTRY
In numerous investigations, the United States Tariff
Commission has run across almost insurmountable diffi-
culties in deciding the principal competing country. The
task is of a very difficult nature, for it is not only
hard to discover the direct source of competition, but
once discovered, this principle source may shift amongst
various countries during the period of investigation.
An example of such a situation is manifested in the
"Butter" investigation. In this particular investigation,
cost data were secured for the farm accounting year
1925-1924, when Denmark was found to be the chief com-
peting country. However, before the war, it was found
that imports from Canada exceeded all others, but that
from 1920 to 1924, these had decreased both relatively

and absolutely, while those from Denmark had shown a
marked increase. In 1925, Denmark fell to a third place
after Canada and New Zealand, respectively.
The majority of the Commission favored the selection
of Denmark holding that its imports entered "en masse"
into the chief butter market of New York, and thus fur-
nished a competitive impact which was not present in the
case of Canadian butter, which entered the United States
at many places widely scattered over the entire border.
Finally, they held that the Danish imports were of a
uniformly high grade, were easily marketable, and that
their price was the price to which practically all the
other butter in the New York market adjusted itself.
Vice-Chairman Dennis dissented from the majority
report. He held that even though Denmark was the prin-
cipal source of imports in the year for which costs were
collected, that in the later year of 1925 Denmark^ loss
of first place was due to its recovery of the German
market, which had been in chaos in 1923, and which, in
turn, had forced it to resort to increased shipments to
the United States. He felt the 1925 conditions were
indicative of the future, wherein the industrial and
nearby markets of England and Germany would serve to take
an ever-increasing share of the Danish product. Thus,
the American market would be of diminishing importance.
•
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He concluded that Denmark was no longer either actually
or potentially the principal competing country.
The majority of the Commission filed a second state-
ment in answer to Mr. Dennis 1 objections to their choice,
in which they pointed out his failure to give proper
regard to the concentration in the entry of the Danish
butter, and to note the abnormality of the year 1925, in
which imports from all countries, except Canada, had de-
creased, while domestic production had materially
increased. They further pointed out that modern trans-
portation facilities provided refrigeration for the
successful carriage of perishable products to practically
all parts of the world. Also, with the growth of im-
perial preference, important and increasing competition
was already being afforded Danish butter in the British
market. This, together with the tariff placed upon im-
ported butter by Germany, effective October 1, 1925,
would likely increase the attractiveness of the American
market instead of decreasing it.
The final say on which country should be selected
as the chief competitor rested with the President; and
in his proclamation changing the duty on butter, he
1
designated Denmark as such.
1. U.S. Tariff Commission, Butter (Government Printing
Office, Washington, 1926), pp. 13-79, 142.
•#
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In the investigation upon Cresylic acid, Phenol,
and Fluorspar, which can be considered together, the
method employed in choosing the principal competitor
was similar to that used in the butter investigation.
In all of these products, England had been the chief
supplier for a great number of years; however, in each
case, she was surpassed by another country in 1926, the
year of extensive and crippling coal strikes in Great
Britain. Since the first two items were by-products of
coal, it was foreseen that Britain would regain her
dominant position with the termination of the strikes.
As for the third product, the maximum duty was re-
quired regardless of whether British or German costs
were selected. It was finally decided in all three
cases that Great Britain was the principal competing
country. The decision was based upon the feeling that
under "normal conditions" that country would be the
2
principal exporter.
A somewhat similar situation existed in the "Lin-
seed Oil" investigation. It was shown that between 1919
to 1925, the greatest amounts of imports had been re-
ceived from the United Kingdom. Subsequent to 1925,
2. U.S. Tariff Commission, Cresylic Acid (Government
Printing Office, Washington, 1927)
, pp. 5-16; Phenol
(1928), p. 5; Fluorspar (1928) p. 18.

Dutch imports had gradually replaced those of the United
Kingdom. The Commission reported that -
"in the Netherlands, production and net exports
of linseed oil have increased, whereas in the
United Kingdom, production and net exports of
linseed oil have decreased. This lends support
to the belief that the Netherlands will continue
to be the chief source of linseed oil into the
United States. The Netherlands is taken as the
chief competing country for the purposes of this
investigation. 3
Concerning the policy pursued in solving the diffi-
culties of "determining the principal competing country,"
a generalization can be reduced. In those cases where
the principal competing country fluctuated on a yearly
or other basis, the Commission apparently established a
definite policy of selecting the country which, in their
opinion, would be the principal competitor with the
United States under normal long run conditions.
SECURING- DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN
COSTS OP PRODUCTION
In the administration of this particular problem,
the Commission encountered its greatest difficulties.
a) Domestic Costs ; Since 1922, the Commission has
obtained domestic costs of production in all investiga-
3. U.S. Tariff Commission, Linseed Oil (Government
Printing Office, Washington, 1929} p. 12.
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tions, but such a task has proved a very expensive and
time-consuming one. Most firms keep financial records,
but not many maintain a cost accounting system in which
adequate costs are proportioned amongst the individual
products. As a result, the accounting division of the
Commission has found it necessary to analyze all avail-
able information, work out cost statements, and segregate
or allocate the cost data for the particular product or
products under investigation* In following this proce-
dure, commodities were classified according to either
manufactured goods or agricultural products.
The most important information required, yet the
most difficult to obtain, was that of joint costs or by-
4
product costs. It was discovered that the cost records
of most producers cover their entire output irrespective
of particular articles or specified grades in circum-
stances where a variety of articles and grades are pro-
duced.
Where there are a number of products resulting from
practically the same process, the practice of apportion-
ing joint costs in the ratio of receipts has come to be
4. U.S. Tariff Commission, Thirteenth Annual Report
(Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1929),
pp. 37-42.
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quite common. This is simple enough and, on its face,
seems an apt solution. As the tariff commission's Chief
Investigator, Mr. Comer, illustrates it in this way:
"If three joint products cost $20 and one of them sells
for $10, another for $7.50 and the third for $5, the
cost of all of them is distributed to each product in the
5
ratio of $10, $7,50 and $5." But a consistent applica-
tion of this principle may lead to some curious results
in the adjustment of tariff rates. For example (Mr.
Comer points out), suppose the cost of raising sheep is
assigned to wool and mutton in proportion to the receipts
from each. It is quite conceivable that little or no
mutton is being imported and that, hence, the duty on
mutton in no way affects its price. Wool, on the other
hand, is being imported and the duty does increase its
price. The increasedprice brings increased receipts;
and if costs are allocated in the ratio of receipts the
cost of producing wool will appear to be increased, and
in order to equalize foreign and domestic costs the duty
will have to be still further increased. Each increase
in duty, therefore, necessitates a still further increase,
and so on until the price becomes prohibitory and the
5. Comer, George P., Tariff Review, August 1929, p. 237.
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duty increases no longer affect It. A protectionist
would reply to this by using as an example a joint-cost
article, the price of which is being depressed by im-
ports. Quite obviously the more the price is depressed
the less would be the cost-allotment under this system
and, therefore, the less would be the protection afforded
Consequently, the practice of allocating costs according
to price receipts may vitiate rather than effectuate the
cost-equalization plan.
Investigation of the cost of producing farm
products involved additional problems. Ordinarily, the
average farmer doesn't keep accurate cost records be-
cause the task of allocating charges against the hired
man, his horses, or even himself, necessarily must be one
of estimation. While -
"cost of production is by definition an exact and
mathematical term, and to obtain it required a
careful examination of cost records prepared and
interpreted under rules of economics and cost
accounting." 6
All of the obstacles enumerated above, and many
others, definitely hinder the obtaining of cost of pro-
duction data of domestic industries; and they are magni-
fied to a greater degree under conditions of foreign
6. U.S. Tariff Commission, Thirteenth Annual Report
(Government Printing Office, Washington, 1929) p.
•
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business methods and languages.
b) Foreign Costs ; In its investigations, the Commis-
sion has invariably discovered from experience that
foreign producers are generally courteous and not too an-
tagonistic upon being requested to reveal figures concern-
ing their competitive situation. Of course, there were
some cases of opposition which necessitated the Commis-
sion^ resorting to secondary sources in order to obtain
foreign cost figures. The following classification shows
the results in tabular form of the Commission's investi-
gations into foreign cost of production data.
Foreign cost data obtained Invest igations
1. Foreign cost data obtained and
verified 46
2# Statements of foreign costs ob-
tained but not verified 2
3. Costs calculated from collateral
information, including prices, wages,
etc 1
Total number of investigations in
v/hich cost data have been obtained.. 49
Invoice Prices Used:
Invoice prices used either because
of objections raised by foreign govern-
ments or because of refusal by foreign
producers 9

No attempt made to secure foreign costs
data either because other information
available to the Commission made it un-
necessary, or because the Commission had
reasons to believe that foreign cost
data could not be obtained 12
Total number of investigations in which
invoice prices have been used 21
Investigations which have been suspended
or have not reached the stage where
foreign cost data have been attempted... 12
Total investigations ordered by the Com- 7
mission for purposes of Section 315 82
In the event that the Commission's agents were re-
fused foreign cost data, the problem arose as to the
alternative sources that might be employed. In answering
this problem, the Commission resorted to invoice prices
as a fair measure of foreign costs. The "Oxalic Acid"
investigation was the first instance in which invoice
prices were used. Such prices showed that the difference
between domestic costs and German invoice prices was suf-
ficiently great to warrant a maximum Increase in duty.
Although these prices contained an element of profit, the
divergence was so great that it was considered unnecessary
8
to accurately figure German costs.
7. Ibid., p. 18.
8» U.S. Tariff Commission, Oxalic Acid (Government Print-
ing Office, Washington, 1925), pp. 4-5.
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In the "Pig-Iron" investigation, the Commission
immediately chose the invoice prices of Indian pig-iron
without even attempting to investigate actual costs of
production. The explanation of the Commission's action
was identical to their reasoning in the oxalic acid
investigation; they maintained that the spread between
the average foreign invoice price and the average domes-
tic cost was greater than could be equalized by a
maximum increase in the duty.
Commissioner Costigan objected to the procedure and
held that the Commission, in departing from its
established practice of securing first hand, itemized
costs, and in resorting to interference and secondary
evidence for the foreign cost figure, must have either
desired to test the legality of the method used or to
practice economy. Ke cited the case of the pig-iron as
typical of the direct change in the Commission's policy.
Mr. Costigan pointed out that the Commission's report
had failed to investigate foreign costs as directed by
section 515, but instead, had inferred such costs from
invoice prices. Whereas invoice prices inherently fail
to satisfy the statute because of the element of profit
contained therein and their facility for falsification
by governments desiring preferential relations with
another, or by collusion on the part of importers and
i
9
exporters
•
Finally, the question of whether or not invoice
prices should be used as evidences of costs was settled
in the investigation on rag rugs. In this case, as in
the two previously mentioned, the Commission used invoice
prices rather than collecting Japanese costs. Likewise,
the maximum duty was required under this procedure.
The President received the Commission's Report on
June 11, 1927, but it wasn't until February 12, 1928,
when he took final action on the findings. This delay
can be primarily attributed to the President's uncertain-
ty concerning the use of invoice prices. The whole
matter was submitted to the Attorney General for his
opinion. On October 19, 1927, the Attorney General
rendered the following opinion:
"that under the provisions of this statute (Section
315, Tariff Act of 1922) the President may refrain
from taking into consideration wages, cost of
materials, and other items of production in com-
peting foreign countries usually ascertainable by
direct inquiry or field work where he finds that
such an inquiry is impracticable in the sense of
being futile. It is obvious that a field inquiry
in Japan, developing more accurate information as
to the cost of production there, would not affect
the result in this particular case unless it dis-
closed that the cost of production in Japan is
higher than the invoice prices of Japanese rugs.
9. U.S. Tariff Commission, Iron in Pigs (Government
Printing Office, Washington, 1927), pp.29 - 56.
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In other words, a field inquiry abroad as to
wages, costs of materials, and other items of
cost of foreign production would be impracticable,
in the sense of being useless, unless foreign
costs are higher than the invoice prices of im-
ported rugs. 10
The Attorney General was also of the opinion that
although the use of invoice prices would tend to lessen
the friction created by direct examination of the books
of foreign producers, they are deficient in an investiga-
tion where the full statutory increase or decrease of duty
11
is not warranted by the cost comparison.
The President then proclaimed a duty change based
upon the above legal opinion and the report of the
majority of the Commission which had used invoice prices
12
as evidence of foreign costs of production.
DETERMINING THE COMPARABILITY
OF DOMESTIC AND IMPORTED PRODUCTS
Another one of the difficult problems confronting
Commissioners in attempting to carry out the administra-
tive provisions of Section 315 is that of comparing the
foreign and domestic costs of production of "like or
10. U.S. Tariff Commission, Eleventh Annual Report (Gov-
ernment Printing Office,Washington, 1927) pp. 11-13.
(Refer to definition and explanation of dumping in
Chapter VII).
11. Ibid., p. 13.
12. U.S. Tariff Commission, Rag Rugs, op.cit.
i
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similar" goods for the purpose of establishing a uniform
quality. It very frequently happens that a foreign
product which is normally considered similar to and in
competition with a domestic article may be different in
kind and quality to the latter item.
The linseed oil investigation furnishes one parti-
cular aspect of the problem. The Commission deemed it
necessary to confine the investigation to crude linseed
oil, since that particular grade of oil was practically
the only type imported, and it was further found that
both the imported and domestic crude linseed oils were
13
of the same quality and grade.
In the "Taximeter" investigation, the Commission
found that four domestic establishments produced taxi-
meters, but only two of the four manufacturers produced
taximeters closely comparable to the imported "Argo"
taximeters made in Germany. Therefore, the Commission
took only the cost of the two companies whose product
was similar in construction and service to the foreign
14
product.
A somewhat similar situation existed in the "gold
13. U.S. Tariff Commission, Linseed Oil, op.cit., p. 2.
14. U.S. Tariff Commission, Taximeters (Government Print-
ing Office, Washington) p. 4.
•
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leaf" investigation. In this particular case, the Com-
mission established comparability on the basis of use.
The imported German leaf was found to be thinner, paler,
and of less purity and metallic value than the domestic
product. In spite of the lack of physical comparability,
it was determined that both products were used inter-
changeably in the stamping of articles such as badges,
pencils, hatbands, signs, as well as in the bookbinding
processes. As a result, the Commission reported unani-
mously that the two products met in competition due to a
direct trade or use comparability; the President ac-
15
cepted their findings.
Another aspect of the problem was experienced in the
"Print Roller" investigation. It was disclosed that the
production of print-rollers in the United States was
accomplished by two different methods: contract shop,
and wall paper mill shops. The costs of the latter
method were 33/o greater than those of the former. The
Commission excluded the high costs of the wall paper mill
shops on the contention that Section 315 definitely
stipulated "competitive costs." Upon further analysis
15. U.S. Tariff Commission, Gold Leaf (Government Print-
ing Office, Washington, 1926) pp. 6-7.
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of the paper mill shops, the Commission discovered that
only two of them had excessive costs which in no way
could be considered in the competitive field with the
costs of the contract shops. Thus, the majority of the
Commission reported to the President a cost difference
which included all foreign producers and all domestic
producers except the two especially high cost mill shops.
Commissioner Costigan objected to that finding, and held
that the average higher costs of the paper mills was
sufficient evidence that they should all be excluded from
cost consideration, in which event a decrease rather than
an increase in the duty would be warranted. The Presi-
dent, however, accepted the findings of the majority of
16
the Commission.
In summing up the cases which have been studied
under the third general classification, the following
can be said: Whenever it was possible, costs were col-
lected from all domestic producers of a given commodity
which was comparable to the imported product. However,
if only a certain portion of the total production of
that commodity was similar to the foreign product, costs
were restricted to only that portion producing the com-
16. U.S. Tariff Commission, Print Rollers (Government
Printing Office, 1926) pp. 9-10.

parable article. The competitive use of a product in
satisfying domestic demand was resorted to as a basis
when physical comparability was not possible. Finally,
it was the Commission's policy not to take into account
high cost producers, since their article was considered
not to be competitive nor comparable with average or low
cost producers.
DETERMINING THE PRINCIPAL MARKET
OR MARKETS IN THE UNITED STATES
Still another major problem confronting the Tariff
Commission was the selection of the principal market or
markets to which transportation costs were to be figured
for any given product in the United States. The primary
difficulty in determining the principal market (or mar-
kets) was due to the variety of meanings attached to the
term.
One interpretation maintains that the principal
market or markets for purposes of Section 315 is con-
sidered to be the principal port of entry of the foreign
product. Another point of view holds that the principal
market or markets may be the one in which both the domes-
tic and foreign article meet in competition in the largest
quantities. Still another theory holds that the principal
market or markets may be the chief consuming area or
••
i
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areas, regardless of whether the product is of domestic
or foreign origin.
Under this last interpretation one authority on the
subject maintains that "Chicago, for example, would he
the principal market for corn, wheat and hogs; Detroit
for plate glass; New York for sugar, although imported
corn may never reach Chicago, and domestic beet sugar
17
may never reach New York."
In the butter and cheese investigations, no explan-
ation was offered by the Commission as to why they chose
New York as the principal market. But in selecting New
York for both the cresylic acid and phenol investigations
the Commission stated that 90 percent of these products
was sold along the Atlantic seaboard states; therefore,
18
they chose New York as the chief competing center. New
York was likewise taken to be the principal market and
the chief consuming center for domestic and foreign
19
frozen eggs.
17. George P. Comer, Finding Cost Under the Flexible
Tariff Provisions, Tariff Review, August 1929.
18. U.S. Tariff Commission, Cresylic Acid, op.cit., p. 10;
Phenol, op.cit., p. 6.
19. U.S. Tariff Commission, Eggs and Egg Products
(Government Printing Office, Washington, 1929 ) p. 28.
-•
-
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In the paint brush handles case, Newark was chosen
the chief competing center, and transportation rates for
the three domestic and one Canadian producers were taken
20
to that point.
In solving this particular problem, it can be said
that the Commission has followed a policy of selecting as
the principal market or markets, that area which in their
opinion was most practical after all conditions were
analyzed.
TRANSPORTATION COSTS
The most bitter controversies that arose over the
administration of Section 315 were waged over the problem
of transportation costs as a necessary factor in cost of
production estimates. Unfortunately, there was nothing
specific in the Tariff Act of 1922 regarding transporta-
tion costs. The provision stated that "all other dis-
advantages or advantages in competition" should be con-
sidered in arriving at the final differences in costs of
production. On account of the vagueness of the statute
in this respect, there existed a difference of opinions
amongst the members of the Tariff Commission with refer-
ence to its interpretation. It was readily recognized by
20. U.S. Tariff Commission, Paint Brush Handles (Govern
ment Printing Office,Washington, 1926 ) pp. 12-14, 18.
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all, that by Including transportation costs in the costs
of producing an article, the importers would reap the ad-
vantages because the costs of transportation would con-
tribute greatly toward equalization of costs without the
levying of a duty.
Beginning with its first investigation, that on
wheat and wheat products, which was submitted to the ChieJ'
Executive on March 4 , 1924, the President followed the
recommendations of those Commissioners who advocated the
inclusion of the transportation charges in estimating the
cost of putting Canadian wheat on the Buffalo market.
As was brought out in the investigation, the ques-
tion revolved itself about the 3 cents (per hundred
pounds) reduction on existing railroad rates for Canadian
wheat moving to the Great Lakes region. Such preferen-
tial treatment was known as the Crow's Nest Pass Agree-
ment; it was established in 1897 between the Dominion
Government and the Canadian Pacific Railway. The reduc-
tion was granted in return for the land grants and the
right to build the railroad through the Government owned
Crow's Nest Pass between Lethbridge and British Colombia.
Commissioners Marvin, Glassie and Burgess objected
to the inclusion of the three cent rate advantage in the
cost of production. They maintained that it was not the
intent of Congress to include transportation costs; and
••
i
they quoted Senator McCumber during the Congressional
debate on the subject as saying that:
"In the authority to take into consideration
matters which shall guide the President's judg-
ment, we have left out of that consideration
entirely the question of transportation. Of
course, the question of transportation neces-
sarily does figure in the question of competition,
but no one wished to give the President the power
to take every unimportant article that is pro-
duced in a section of the country so far distant
that the freight itself would be many times what
the article would be worth in the field of con-
sumption under the ordinary tariff duties." 21
They further held that the omission of transportation
costs by Congress was a deliberate action. They sub-
stantiated this argument by pointing out that the above
statement of the Senator in charge of the bill was neither
challenged nor contradicted.
On the other hand, Commissioners Culbertson, Lewis
and Costigan advocated the inclusion of transportation
costs; however, they referred to the 3 cent reduction as
"what may be fairly regarded as, in effect, a bounty from
22
the Canadian Government." In proclaiming the duty
change, the President acted favorably on the suggestion
of the three latter Commissioners; nevertheless, he
actually didn't settle the question of whether transpor-
21. U.S. Tariff Commission, Wheat and Wheat Products
,
(Government Printing Office, Washington, 1924)
pp. 32-34.
22. Ibid
., pp. 42-43.
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tation costs, which were not considered as bounties,
should be included.
In the investigations concerning "Men's Sewed Straw
Hats," the problem was not so easily eliminated. Shortly-
after the report of the investigation was presented to
the President, he requested the Tariff Commission to
prepare a detailed analysis of its reasons for and
against the inclusion of transportation costs, as an aid
in reaching his decision. Approximately one month later,
the Commission's report was submitted to the President.
With reference to the reasons favoring the inclusion
of such costs, the argument developed along the following
pattern. It was held that Section 315 actually meant -
"that not only are technical production costs to
be assembled, but also that in the fields of
both production and commerce, transportation
furnishes one of the conditions of production,
and manifestly one of the advantages or disad-
vantages in competition which, not being excluded
by any language of the subdivision or section,
is necessarily embraced among the factors which,
under that section, must be taken into consider-
ation by the President." 23
In connection with the above reasoning, it was
pointed out that the limitation of the President's power
to raise or lower existing rates not greater than 50 per-
cent, as well as denying him the right to transfer a
23. U.S. Tariff Commission, Transportation Costs and
Costs of Production (Government Printing Office,
Washington, 1926) pp. 9-36.
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commodity from the free list to the dutiable list, were
explicit restrictions. Therefore, the absence of any
specific clause regarding the inclusion or exclusion of
transportation costs, may mean that the power in question
continues to reside in the President under the sweeping
24
language of subdivision (c) of Section 315,
In further defense of the inclusion of transporta-
tion costs, several well known economists were consulted
for their views on the subject. Some of their statements
are listed as follows:
"The act of production can be reduced to the f ollow-
ing three operations:
1) Changing the form of things or combining or
rearranging them.
2) Changing their place.
3) Keeping them until such time as they are
wanted; in other words production adds to
the materials of nature, form or composi-
tion utility, time utility, and place
utility." 25
"The creation of time and place utilities is as
truly productive of wealth as the creation of
elementary material utilities. Trade and trans-
portation which deal with place utilities are no
less productive than the activities expended in
creating material utilities." 26
24. Ibid .
25. Richard T. Ely, Outlines of Economics (New York: The
Macmillan Co., 1917} p. 116.
26. Edwin R. A. Sellgman, Principles of Economics (New York
Longmans, Green and Co. 1905) pp. 275-276.
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The arguments opposing the inclusion of transporta-
tion costs developed along the following pattern.
It was maintained that the phrase "cost of produc-
tion" when employed in the normal sense did not imply the
inclusion of transportation costs. In order to verify
such a statement, a Supreme Court decision was quoted:
"No distinction is more popular to the common mind
than that between manufacture and commerce.
Manufacture is fashioning of raw materials into
form for use. The functions of commerce are dif-
ferent. The buying and selling and the transpor-
tation incidental thereto constitute commerce." 27
Also, it was held, that although nothing definite
concerning transportation costs was stated in sub-
division (c) of Section 315, if such costs were to be
included - how should they be applied? This lack of
explicitness in the statute concerning application of
transportation costs was ample evidence of the fact that
Congress had no intention that anything should be done on
such an important point. In substantiating this point,
the report cited a detailed account of the Congressional
debates placing special emphasis upon Senator McCumber's
testimony, which was quoted previously in the wheat
investigation.
Finally, the Commission^ report was turned over to
27. Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888).
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the Attorney General, requesting that he submit an opinion
on the question to the President. On February 2, 1926,
the Attorney General rendered his opinion, which stated
among other things that -
"subdivision (c) of section 315 of the Tariff Act
of 1922 provides that in ascertaining the costs
of production. . .the President insofar as he finds
it practicable, shall take into consideration
1) the differences in conditions of produc-
tion, including wages, costs of materials,
etc.
2) the differences in the wholesale selling
prices of domestic and foreign articles in
the principle markets of the United States.
3) advantages granted to a foreign producer
or government, etc.
4) any other advantages or disadvantages in
competitio n.
"If differences in transportation costs result in
advantages or disadvantages, the President is
directed to take such differences in transportation
costs into consideration insofar as he finds it
practicable to do so." 28
Approximately one week and one half after the de-
livery of the Attorney General's opinion, the President,
in proclaiming the rate of duty for men's straw hats,
included the transportation costs of Italian hats to the
New York market.
Since the Attorney General's opinion, the Tariff
Commission has generally followed the rule of including
transportation costs in cost of production data. It is
28. Hearings before Select Senate Committee, op. cit
.
,
p. 480.
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also evident that the Chief Executive under the provi-
sions of section 315 had more or less of a free hand in
deciding upon the inclusion or exclusion of transporta-
tion costs until the passage of the Hawley Smoot Tariff
Act of 1930 which definitely stipulated in subdivision
(b) of section 336 the inclusion of transportation costs
in computing cost of production data. But, prior to the
passage of the Hawley Smoot Act, there was a variety of
methods employed by the Commission in applying trans-
portation costs. "However, in practice, the Commission
did tend toward the acceptance of some system of weight-
29
ing transportation costs."
29. Comer, op.clt., pp. 237-239.
•

CHAPTER VII
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF FOREIGN
TRADE PRACTICES
Generally speaking, a very potent argument has been
advanced for the promotion of higher protective duties in
the United States, The argument recognizes the necessity
of offsetting, by means of a high tariff wall, unfair
foreign competition, particularly predatory dumping. By
convincing the American people on the patriotic issue of
protecting the American standard of living, the result
has been, from an administrative point of view at least,
a gradual development in the last two decades of adminis-
trative legislation directed at the control of unjust
foreign trade practices.
DUMPING PRACTICES
Professor Viner has defined dumping as "price dis-
crimination between national markets." This broad
definition includes all price discrimination, whether in
the different export markets or "reverse dumping" where
the home market of the seller is made the dumping ground
and the higher prices are charged to the purchasers in
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foreign countries.
It also includes "spurious dumping" which may not
always be price discrimination, but rather a variation
in credit terms, credit risks, grades of commodities,
and price adjustment to the size of orders. There is also
what is sometimes called "exchange dumping," or the de-
preciation of paper currency in order to put a premium
on exports by causing export prices to be temporarily, if
2
not permanently, low in terms of foreign currencies.
Freight dumping, or the granting of preferential rates
to goods destined for export, or for a particular market,
is not an uncommon practice in some countries. And
"concealed dumping," or the maintenance of secrecy about
export prices, is sometimes practiced through the use of
commission merchants to whom goods are assigned for the
purpose of obtaining the best prices possible. For of-
ficial purposes, dumping has been defined as "the sale
of imported merchandise at less than its prevailing
3
market or wholesale price in the country of production."
1. Jacob Viner, Dumping: A Problem in International
Trade (Chicago, 1923) pp. 1-4, 7-8.
2. Ibid
. ,
Chapter V.
3. U.S. Tariff Commission, Information Concerning Dumping
and Unfair Foreign Competition in the U.S. (Government
Printing Office, Washington, 1919) p. 9.
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A classification of dumping practices according to
motive and continuity as presented by Professor Viner
4
is summed up in the following table and paragraph.
Motive Continuity
A) To dispose of casual overstock Sporadic
B) Unintentional
•
C) To maintain connections in a Short run or
market in which prices are on re- intermittent
maining considerations unaccept-
able .
D) To develop trade connections and
buyer f s good will in a new market.
E) To eliminate competition in the
market dumped upon. Short run
P) To forestall the development of or
competition in the market dumped intermittent
upon.
G) To retaliate against dumping in
the reverse direction.
H) To maintain full production from
existing plant facilities without
cutting domestic prices. Long Run
I) To obtain the economies of larger or
scale production without cutting continuous
domestic prices.
J) On purely mercantil istic grounds.
A) In disposing of casual overstock, a producer has
a choice of holding over, and probably incurring a
greater expense and additional surplus, reducing his
prices in his existing market and facing the difficulty
4. Ibid., Chapter II.

in the future of trying to restore the price, or he may-
dispose of the surplus stocks in a new and distant market
at whatever price he may be able to get - usually below
his standard price.
B) Unintentional dumping occurs only when goods are
exported in anticipation of their sale at a profitable
price, and for some reason delivery cannot be made as
prearranged.
C) It is sometimes necessary, in order to keep con-
trol of a particular market, to reduce the price below a
profitable level.
D) The producer may sell at a reduced price in a new
territory for the purpose of creating a market where none
has existed. This has frequently been practiced by
English merchants seeking to create markets in the
colonies
.
E) The most "malignant" type of dumping is that
commonly referred to as predatory dumping. In this a con-
cern seeks to eliminate its competitor from a particular
field, or it seeks to force the competitor to accept its
terms
.
F) The dumping may be for the purpose of forestalling
a potential competitive development.
G) It maybe a retaliatory measure - i.e., the com

pany which is confronting competition from a foreign con-
cern which is dumping in its territory may dump in the
territory of the other.
E) If a protected manufacturer is able to maintain a
domestic price which is higher than that in foreign mar-
kets, he may be forced to accept a lower price for his
exported goods. This has frequently been the position of
American manufacturers who have sold in foreign markets
at cheaper rates in order to keep their men employed and
their works running.
I) Frequently the existing overhead expense of a
factory, without much additional outlay, may be turned to
a larger scale production, which will result in economies
in unit coats which make possible expansion as under (D)
or (H).
J) Dumping on mercantil istic grounds is a matter of
national policy and is rarely done on private initiative.
EARLY INSTANCES OF DUMPING IN
UNITED STATES TARIFF HISTORY
The practice of dumping was first brought to the
attention of our founding fathers when Alexander Hamilton
in his "Report on Manufactures," made mention of the fact
5. Ibid.
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"that certain nations grant bounties on the ex-
portation of particular commodities to enable
their own workmen to undersell and supplant all
competitors in the countries to which these
commodities were sent." 6
For approximately twenty years following the war of
1812, English manufacturers were continually being at-
tacked for practicing predatory dumping in the United
States. These charges were more or less substantiated by
a chance remark in the House of Commons, April 9, 1816,
which provided the necessary impetus to the then growing
momentum of Hamiltonian protectionists. The English
Parliament member, a Mr. Henry Brougham, in discussing
the post war depression and general overproduction of
goods, maintained that in disposing of the English sur-
plus, his countrymen were compelled to turn to American
markets -
"because ultimately the Americans will pay, which
the exhausted state of the continent renders un-
likely; and because it is well worth while to
incur a loss upon the first exportation in order,
by the glut, to stifle in the cradle those rising
manufactures in the United States which the war
had forced into existence contrary to the
natural course of things." 7
As Professor Viner indicates, the primary purpose
6. Frank W. Taussig, State Papers and Speeches on the
Tariff , Harvard University, 1892, pp. 31-32.
7. Ibid., pp. 91-92.
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of the English was to render the infant industries of
8
America impotent. And according to another authority
on the subject, the above words "have often since done
9
their duty in firing the protectionist heart."
As time progressed the protectionist argument lost
weight with the increasing importance of "cotton" as a
factor in shaping national policy. The southern planters
were opposed to any tariff barriers which might have
repercussions on their export trade. Prom 1825 to the
beginning of the Civil War, the manufacturers in the
north experienced as much difficulty in maneuvering a
high tariff through Congress as the farmers have since
the Civil War in obtaining a low tariff.
Prom 1890 to 1914 German manufacturers were charged
with excessive price discriminations in international
markets. However, it is nearer the truth to say that
producers of practically all countries of commercial im-
portance have indulged in dumping as frequently and as
much as the practice has proved profitable to them.
AHTI-DUMPING LEGISLATION
The growth of dumping practices during the last half
8. Viner, op. cit
. , pp. 41-43.
9. Stanwood, op. cit
. ,
Vol.1, p. 168.

of the nineteenth century has resulted in a great degree
of anti-dumping legislation since the beginning of the
twentieth century. Dumping is practiced either on an
unofficial (i.e., private) basis, or under a system of
official bounties. I shall continue to discuss unoffi-
cial dumping practices against which the development of
anti-dumping legislation has been primarily directed.
(Official dumping practices are considered in the second
part of this chapter.)
A move on the part of Congress to offset dumping
and unfair competition by other means than protective
duties culminated in the Revenue Act of 1916. Sections
800-801 of the Act make predatory dumping in the United
States a criminal offense. Any importer who "commonly
and systematically causes to be imported or sold...
articles within the United States at a price substantially
less than the actual market value is guilty of a mis-
demeanor and subject to a fine not to exceed $5000 or
imprisonment, not to exceed one year, or both; and any
person injured by such unfair competition shall recover
10
threefold the damages sustained."
This anti-dumping provision failed to be an effec-
10. Sections 800-801, Revenue Act of 1916.

tive remedy. The one who indulges in the unfair practice
is usually the foreign exporter or manufacturer and not
necessarily the American importer; therefore, the real
offender is not within the jurisdiction of the United
States Courts. It is not easy to determine, for purposes
of enforcing a criminal statute, just when the price for
imported goods is "substantially less" than the actual
market value or wholesale price abroad. Since the law
applied only to those who "commonly and systematically
import foreign articles," it does not apply to those who
do sporadic dumping. And the necessity of proving that
such importation was made with the intent to injure,
destroy or prevent the establishment of an industry in
this country, or to monopolize trade, renders it virtually
11
useless as a criminal statute.
The failure of the first anti-dumping provision was
followed by a move on the part of the U.S. Tariff Commis-
sion to investigate the anti-dumping provisions of other
countries with the view to framing a more successful law
for the United States. The direct result of the Commis-
sion^ study was "Title II of the Emergency Tariff Act of
1921."
11. U.S. Tariff Commission, Information Concerning Dumping
and Unfair Trade Practices
,
op. cit
. , p. 33.
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By this act, the Secretary of the Treasury is given
authority to add a dumping duty to the regular duty when
he finds that the "purchase price" or the "exporter's
12
sale price" is less than the foreign market value.
The provisions of the act include goods on the free
list as well as the dutiable:
"Whenever the Secretary of the Treasury after such
investigation as he deems necessary, finds that
an industry in the United States is being or is
likely to he injured, or is prevented from being
established, by reason of the importation into
the United States of a class or kind of foreign
merchandise which is likely to be sold at less
than its fair value, the Secretary shall make
such findings public to the extent he deems nec-
essary," 13
This part (Title II) of the Emergency Tariff Act of
1921, has been continued in an unaltered form in the
Tariff Acts of 1922 and 1930. Prom an administrative
point of view, the powers and duties at the discretion
of the Secretary of the Treasury are identical in many
respects to the President's authority outlined in Section
336 of the Tariff Act of 1930. In the President's case,
an investigation by the Tariff Commission is definitely
provided for, and public opinion is likely to be strong
against the action of the President if he disregards the
12. Section 203, 204, Tariff Act of 1921.
13. Section 201(a), Tariff Act of 1921.
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Commission's advice and recommendations. The Secretary
of the Treasury, however, is free to act upon whatever
advice he may choose to accept and from whatever source
he wishes. It is for him to decide whether he will
accept the advice of private interests or others. It is
for him to decide when an industry of the United States
"is "being or is likely to he injured." And it is for
him to say what is "fair value."
With the Secretary of the Treasury being empowered
to act at will, evidences of hasty action on his part
were not lacking. In two Court cases involving reap-
praisement appeals against the arbitrary and unjustified
action of the Secretary of the Treasury, the decision of
the Customs Court restrained the Secretary from basing
14
his accusations on insufficient facts. Following such
Court action, the use of administrative anti-dumping
measures on the part of successive Secretaries of the
Treasury has shown signs of more caution.
BOUNTY PRACTICES
Ordinarily in trade circles a bounty or subsidy is
considered a contribution over and above the remission of
14. Kleberg and Co. Inc . v. United States , 61 Treasury
Decisions No. 2, January 14,1932. Amtorg Trading
Corp . v. United States
,
Treasury Decisions, March
31, 1932.

drawbacks and. other domestic excise taxes. It is an of-
ficial grant bestowed by a government as opposed to the
previously discussed unofficial or private trade prac-
tices .
The practice of open and direct bounties commenced
with the development of nationalism in the mercantilist ic
age.
By the payment of lump sums to certain industrial-
ists, by the exemption from taxation, by the bestowal of
gifts to individuals engaged in a rising industry, by
annual pension, or by loans given without interest, it
was hoped to build up a favorable trade advantage which
would increase the gold supply of the nation. Such prac-
tices were not confined to a single nation. It was
eventually realized that such a policy could not continue
indefinitely without unfavorable repercussions. In fact,
it became increasingly evident that competing countries
began a similar system of bounties to develop their own
export trade.
With the coming of the industrial age in the latter
days of the nineteenth century, there were renewed de-
mands for official aid to manufactures in the form of
higher protective duties and, whenever possible, export
subsidies
.
•
The new system of export bounties was more Indirect
in that it was not open but included in legislation.
Professor Viner classifies these bounties as -
"a) Refunds upon the export of commodities which
have been subjected to internal excise
taxation, of amounts in excess of the taxes
which had actually been collected upon them.
"b) Refunds upon the exports of goods manufactured
from imported materials upon which imported
duties had been imposed, of drawbacks of duty
in excess of the amounts of import duties which
had actually been collected upon the materials
from which they were made.
"c) Grants of drawbacks upon the export of goods
made from materials of a kind subject to duty
upon importation, even though the materials
actually used in their manufacture or produc-
tion were of domestic origin and not im-
ported." 15
The methods of counteracting such official aid to
exporters have varied from that of anti-bounty clauses
in bilateral and multilateral treaties to bounty counter-
vailing duties. It is this latter method that we are
immediately interested in.
CONTROL THROUGH COUNTERVAILING DUTIES
The idea of combating bounties with countervailing
duties originated with the United States Tariff Act of
1890, which introduced bounty countervailing duties as
15. Viner, op. cit
. , pp. 163-164.
4
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applicable to sugar. Nine years later the idea was con-
tinued in the Tariff Act of 1897 which provided for ad-
ditional duties, equal to the amount of any "bounty paid
"by a foreign country directly or indirectly, upon the ex-
17
portation of goods to this country.
The later Tariff Acts of the United States, and
foreign countries as well, have contained similar pro-
visions. It has become the accepted method of retali-
ation.
On the whole, countervailing duties which have been
directed at retaliation against bounties have been effec-
tive. Even though they are rarely resorted to, the mere
existence of the threat often accomplishes the purpose.
In one of its annual reports, the United States Tariff
Commission laid emphasis on the fact that it is only
necessary to call the attention of foreign governments
to the existence of bounty countervailing provisions in
order to secure the abolition of export bounties. Perhaps
one reason for the effectiveness of such a threat is the
fact that some of these provisions can be very severe
when actually applied. Under a ruling of the Treasury
I 16. Section 237, Act of October 1, 1890.
17. Section 5, Tariff Act of July 24, 1897.

Department, a countervailing duty was imposed for a time
on all the sugar imported from Denmark, while only one
grade of the refined sugar was actually receiving an
18
export bounty.
Section 303 of the two most recent Tariff Acts pro-
vides that -
"whenever any country, dependency, person, partner-
ship, association, cartel or corporation shall
pay or "bestow, directly or indirectly, any bounty
or grant upon the manufacture or production or
export of any article, . .and such article or mer-
chandise is dutiable under the provisions of this
act, then upon the importation of any such
article into the United States, there shall be
Imposed by this act, an additional duty equal to
the net amount of each bounty or grant. The Sec-
retary of the Treasury shall from time to time
ascertain and determine, or estimate, the net
amount of each bounty or grant."
With the language of Section 303 as it stands, a
Secretary of the Treasury with a strong protectionist
leaning could make a wide application of the bounty-
countervailing provision if he so desired. In actual
practice (as we indicated earlier in the chapter) the
Treasury Department has used the discretion provided
the Secretary rather cautiously following the two
Customs Courts decisions in the matter. Undoubtedly such
a policy is wise because if the United States should
18. Viner, op. cit
. , p. 173
*
start a rigid system of applying bounty-countervailing
duties, and other countries should decide to apply similar
countervailing measures to offset the advantage of the
original export bounties, where would such commercial
warfare end?
SECRETARY OP THE TREASURY
V.
THE PRESIDENT
From an administrative point of view, it appears that
the duties and powers of the Secretary of the Treasury
(which originated in the Emergency Tariff Act of 1921 and
were repeated in Section 303 of the two most recent
tariff acts) are similar in a great many respects to the
President's control over the administration of the cost
equalization formula outlined in the flexible provisions
of the same two tariff laws. One of the principal pro-
visions of the anti-dumping provisions that may be of-
fered is that it provides no authorized agency or agencies
for making investigations into cases of alleged dumping.
The Secretary is not restricted to a definitely stated
set of facts; he may act upon his own convictions, or he
may act upon the advice of others. While the President
may do much the same under Section 336 of the Tariff Act
of 1930, still some investigation by the Tariff Commis-
sion is required.
137.
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As was stressed in the previous chapters, there has
been a great deal of opposition to the delegation of
legislative powers to the President even where a prelim-
inary investigation to establish a definite set of facts
had been conducted. And yet, under the anti-dumping pro-
visions, the Secretary of the Treasury is empowered to
lay and collect duties (which is definitely a legislative
function) at his discretion.
As the situation now stands, the Secretary of the
Treasury ascertains such facts as he desires, under such
rules and regulations as Mhe may deem necessary," and
imposes "an additional duty equal to the net amount of
such bounty or grant" as he finds existing in any foreign
country. And the President, under Section 338 of the
Tariff Act of 1930 (Section 317 of the Tariff Act of 1922)
may exclude the goods of any country which "discriminates
in fact" against the trade of the United States. The
former provision is applicable to any bounty, whether
discriminatory or not. The latter is chiefly designed
as a penalty for those nations which do not accord the
same trade privileges to the United States as to other
countries. In spite of the differences in the purpose of
the two provisions, the Congressional delegation of
authority to administer each separately is very similar.
The fact that the Secretary is not bound by a preliminary

investigation of the Tariff Commission or any other
agency, signifies that Congress has awarded the Secretary
of the Treasury more administrative authority over
tariff policy than it has delegated to the Chief Execu-
tive.
As was noted earlier in the chapter, the decisions
of the United States Customs Court have provided a
restraining influence in the Secretary ! s actions. Never-
theless, the very existence of the wording on the
statutes of the administrative powers delegated to the
Secretary of the Treasury is indicative of the overlapping
of administrative functions pertaining to the control of
foreign trade practices.

CHAPTER VIII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
SUMMARY
The solution of this country* s several problems of
international trade by jumping at first one expedient
and then another, as the emergency seems to arise, has
left the United States with a maze of administrative
machinery and provisions, the comprehension of which few
citizens can properly understand. It is not impossible
to find the State Department pursuing one line, the De-
partment of Commerce another; the Treasury Department
investigating action to suppress dumping; the Tariff Com-
mission advising the President to reduce a customs rate
or increase one; and the President himself taking mea-
sures to carry out a policy diametrically opposed to the
avowed program of one of the above agencies.
TARIFF COMMISSION
It is impossible to read the history of the United
States Tariff Commission without a growing conviction
that once responsibility had been given it to determine
the "equalizing rate," the same business interests that
had gone into politics to get a tariff to their liking
through Congress continued in politics to get a tariff to
their liking through the Tariff Commission. These in-
140.
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terests first used pressure to have satisfactory person-
nel appointed, and then, perhaps without any great amount
of further pressure, had left it to their representatives
on the Commission to discover that the equalizing rate
was an appropriate rate. Of no minor significance in
this respect has been the influence exerted over the Com-
mission "by the President himself. It is true that the
Tariff Commission has performed laudable work in the col-
lection and presentation of tariff information, but it
remains, in effect, a fact finding body.
THE PRESIDENT'S POWER
Since the days of George Washington, Congress has
been delegating authority to the President to control
matters affecting foreign trade. There has been a steady
increase, especially since 1890, in both the scope and
nature of such delegated powers. With respect to the
tariff, authority was first of all delegated to the Presi-
dent to make new or temporary tariff rates in the form of
penalty duties against goods coming from a country which
was discriminating against our trade and commerce. Al-
most simultaneously, he was awarded the power to conclude
reciprocity treaties and agreements with friendly coun-
tries for the purpose of better trade advantages. But
finally, the delegation to the President in 1922 of au-
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thority to make new customs rates; to reclassify, and, in
so doing, to rev/rite the tariff bill; and to change the
valuation of goods coming into the United States from the
foreign value to the American selling price as a basis
for duty assessments, has been about the last word in the
delegation of legislative authority to the President.
Under the present administrative provisions of the exist-
ing tariff law, there is little- which Congress might wish
to do with the tariff situation which cannot now be done
by the President.
THE FLEXIBLE TARIFF
Prior to and subsequent to the passage of the Tariff
Act of 1922, it was hailed as a means whereby the tariff
would once and for all be taken out of politics and made
scientific. In 1922, the question was whether Congress
should continue to deal with the cumbersome and time
consuming process of tariff changes, or whether Congress
should delegate its power under specified limitations to
the United States Tariff Commission and the President. As
we know, Congress chose the latter policy and the adminis-
tration of the tariff was given over. It is of importance
to note the composition of the recipients of that pov/er.
According to section 700 of the Revenue Act of 1916,
which established the Tariff Commission, it was provided
*
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that the Commission should be composed of six members, not
more than three of whom could be from the same political
party. On the surface at least, the law creating the
tariff commission was an attempt for an impartial commis-
sion.
An important factor to be considered, however, is
the agency to whom the Commission should report the re-
sults of its investigations for tariff changes. That
agency was the Chief Executive. Therefore, even though
the Commission was composed of three high protection
Republicans and three low protection Democrats, the
balance of power would be in the hands of the Executive,
who would, presumably, be ruled by his party beliefs.
Thus, the arrangement provided for under the flexible
provisions could not be held in any way as contributing
towards the removal of the tariff from politics.
ADMINISTRATION OP THE COST
EQUALIZATION FORMULA
Congress laid down, in 1922, what might be called an
administrative yardstick for the measurement of duties.
Duties were to equalize foreign and domestic costs of
production. Therefore, the question arose - if the Tar-
iff Commission is to equalize costs of production, whose
costs are to be taken? Some producers are efficient,
others are inefficient. If the costs of the marginal or
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least efficient producer were taken, it would have meant
that the tariff rate would have more than equalized the
costs of all the other producers above the margin. That
would have been full protection, resulting in the complete
stoppage of imports. If the costs of the most efficient
producer were taken, the resultant degree of protection
would have been practically ineffective, since only the
most efficient producer would have reaped benefits from
the tariff rates.
A former member of the Tariff Commission and author-
ity on the subject can be quoted as saying that "the ap-
plication of the difference between costs as a measure of
duties is usually impossible owing to the difficulty of
1
finding what the difference amounts to." Support for
the previous statement is easily at hand from our pre-
vious analysis of the difficulty encountered by the Com-
mission in determining the chief competing country and
the chief competing market in the United States. The dif-
ficulty of estimating costs of production for by-products,
p
the determination of satisfactory comparability between
the domestic and imported products, and the determination
of both foreign and domestic costs were other factors
1. Thomas W. Page, Making the Tariff in the United States
(New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1924) p. 83.
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which complicated the efforts of the Commission in arriv-
ing at the final cost figures.
In another observation Mr. Page says "the difficul-
ties in obtaining and verifying costs of production are
infinitely greater in foreign countries than they are in
the United States. Not only was there the element of
national sentiment militating against the submission of
costs to the agents of a foreign Commission, but also
there were the difficulties of understanding the foreign
2
language and foreign business practices." One cannot
>
but agree with Mr. Page, who, as a former member of the
Tariff Commission, possessing practical experience in such
matters, maintains "the conclusion cannot be escaped that
it is rarely possible to ascertain accurately the differ-
3
ence in costs of production at home and abroad."
FOREIGN TRADE PRACTICES
It is indeed difficult for the layman to understand
how the President can more or less invade the realm of
legislative prerogatives and actually levy a tax on im-
ports. Yet, we have a very similar administrative action
by the Secretary of the Treasury, which is considered by
J
2. Ibid., p. 95.
3. Ibid
. , p. 99.
*
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many authorities to be a greater degree of usurpation of
legislative power than the Chief Executive enjoys. Both
recipients of such delegation of authority have at times
shown evidences of being arbitrary in exercising their
discretion. In fact, what could be more arbitrary than
the action of the President with the assistance of the
Tariff Commission in increasing the duty on Swiss cheese
without making any investigation as to the cost of such
cheese in Switzerland? By concluding that he considered
the higher prices of imported Swiss cheese as a "disad-
vantage" to domestic producers of Swiss cheese, he
neglected the probability that the higher prices of Swiss
made cheese might be due to a higher cost of production,
and, therefore, an advantage rather than a disadvantage
'
to American producers. Likewise, we have evidence of the
arbitrary action of the Secretary of the Treasury who
issued a finding of dumping on a shipment of matches from
Soviet Russia, not on the basis of facts, but upon the
mere judgment of a customs appraiser. Thus, this study
clearly demonstrates that under the existing Congression-
al policy of delegating legislative powers to the
Executive and other administrative branches of the govern-
ment, more restriction should be placed upon the arbitrary
administrative decisions of one man or a small group of
men, which ultimately leaves effects upon the economy
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as a whole,
CONCLUSIONS
As indicated by this study, we have confined our-
selves to the change that has taken place in United States
Tariff Policy. The reversal in this particular field has
occurred through the gradual development of administra-
tive powers in the possession of government officials and
committees. There are listed in the following pages a
few sincere methods of possibly checking the trend toward
more administrative regulation in our tariff policy.
A MORE DEMOCRATIC PROCEDURE
As long as we, the people, accept "protection" as a
principle of national policy, as long as we accept
"private enterprise" as another principle and "represen-
tative government" as still another, and as long as human
nature in its pursuit of gain is what it is, private
enterprise will endeavor to shape the tariff in its own
interest, and to this end will endeavor to control that
branch of government which has the rate making power.
This will be true also should the United States ever go
over to a free trade or lower tariff policy.
For the visible future at least, I can foresee that
we shall continue to have a protective tariff, and rates,
whether fixed by Congress, a Commission, or the President,
••
•
i
i
will, in fact, be determined by concession and compromise
or some other more questionable methods. All that I
contend is that since the tariff is bound to be a re-
sultant of conflicting pressures, all persons who are
burdened by it, as well as all who are benefited, know
where their interest lies and will exert pressure accord-
ingly.
In reference to this, this study has attempted to
show that decisions of the members were unanimous in the
many factual and informational studies made by the Com-
mission. But it has also shown that in its investiga-
tions of costs of production, decisions were more likely
to be divided, and, what is even more significant, that
the division followed a sharp line of cleavage; the Com-
missioners with protectionist leanings so handling the
data as to warrant a higher rate; whereas the low tariff
advocates were interpreting the statistics towards jus-
tification of low rates.
It has also manifested that investigations by the
Commission have been slow and expensive, and have failed
to make the tariff speedily adaptable to changing compe-
titive conditions.
Up to 1922, the special interests have had only one
body to manipulate in shaping a tariff to their liking,
namely, Congress. Since that date they have had three:

149.
>
•
Congress, the Tariff Commission, and the President. With
the President possessing the power of changing the per-
sonnel of the Commission, tariff rates may he counted on
to rise, if he is a protectionist, and to fall, if he is
a free trader - and this in spite of the apparently
scientific provisions that the duty must equal the dif-
ferences in costs.
Thus, the members of the Tariff Commission must be
above suspicion in their principal duty of assembling and
presenting facts. Whatever the political and economic
views of the Commissioners and whatever their professional
connections, the thing of paramount importance is that
they should all be men of the highest calibre and men
nationally recognized as of the highest ability in their
field. How to get such men is a problem which is not
easily solved under our present political conditions. The
solution depends on the appointing power, and considering
the pressures which are brought to bear on that power,
we can only hope for the appointment of superior indivi-
duals, which will form a Commission approaching the ideal.
As to whether the final naming of the rate should
be lodged with the Tariff Commission, the President, or
with Congress, I favor the submission to Congress of the
Commission's reports with the actual naming of the rates
reserved to Congress as the Constitution intended. The
•
-•
present arrangement places too many arbitrary powers in
the hands of one man.
It is true that if the naming of tariff rates were
fully returned to Congress, the tariff would continue to
be the resultant of conflicting interests in the future
as it has been in the past. Such a solution will be ob-
jected to on the grounds of being no solution at all.
Nevertheless, it is the nearest thing to a democratic
solution of the problem. The people's representatives
will determine rates based upon accurate and official in-
formation as to who receives the benefit and who bears
the burden, as to how great is the benefit and how great
the burden. The principles of representative democracy
are realized to a greater degree in the orderly debate
and resultant decisions of three hundred men than in the
arbitrary decision of one man.
THE FAILURE OF A PLAN
I have tried to point out in this study how the "cost
equalization formula" failed in its purpose, leaving in
its wake a maze of administrative machinery. In instruc-
ting the Tariff Commission to equalize costs of produc-
tion, section 336 of the Tariff Act of 193C enumerated
certain factors such as wages, costs of materials;
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transportation costs, and other advantap-es or disadvan-
tages which may be taken into account. It leaves great
discretion to the Commission as to methods of collecting
data and of handling them when collected. It may take a
single year or the average of several years as a "basis
in making its cost studies. It may devise its own
formula for handling joint costs. In the case of agri-
cultural costs it may impute such values as it sees fit
as wages to the farmer and his family, or as prices, to
the materials produced and consumed on the farm. As it
is seldom possible to get returns from all business con-
cerns engaged in an industry, the Commission has had to
use its own judgment in sampling. In order to get the
equalizing costs from the many costs collected, it may
use the simple average, the weighted average of invoice
prices or wholesale prices, or the marginal cost. The
fact that so much option is left to the Commission in its
method of determining the "equalizing rate" indicates
that the body is really performing a legislative act
rather than an administrative one.
The present administrative tariff set up, with its
provisions for a cost equalization tariff, or a recipro-
city tariff - the one promoting tariff increases, and
the other aimed at tariff decreases - is sweeping and
paradoxical in its scope. The latter is from the point
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of view of constitutional law, sound in principle. Under
the Reciprocal Trade Agreements which were enacted as an
amendment to the Tariff Act of 1930, the President is
given authority to alter rates upon the "basis of certain
facts - definitely and easily ascertainable - i.e., upon
the establishment of specific tariff reductions by
neighboring countries. But the former provision (for
cost equalization), regardless of what the Court may have
decided in the Hampton Case, involves endless speculation
and the handling of much controversial data. Even the
late Chief Justice Taft, who gave the Court's opinion in
the Hampton Case, admitted as much. Likewise, the ad-
ministrative problems encountered by the Tariff Commis-
sion (as outlined in Chapter V) in trying to determing
cost equalizations, bear more abundant and indisputable
evidence of this fact. It, therefore, seems obvious that
if the current reciprocity policy is not renewed in 1948,
some other plan than one as vague as equalization of cost
differences should be set up.
KEEP FOR ADMINISTRATIVE COORDINATION
We have deliberately indicated that the Secretary of
the Treasury in issuing anti-dumping orders is not as-
sisted by a preliminary thorough investigation such as
the President enjoys through the medium of the Tariff
Commission. The background of this continued possession

of such arbitrary power on the Secretary if somewhat
puzzling. One may rightly ask why the anti-dumping pro-
visions of the Emergency Tariff Act were not revised, and
definitely incorporated with the administrative sections
of the Tariff Act of 1922. Instead, the provisions re-
mained unaltered in "both the 1922 and 1930 acts. The
only possible explanation is that the battle in Congress
turned on the flexible section 315 (Tariff Act of 1922),
and section 336(Tariff Act of 1930). There has been no
indication from the Tariff Commission's practices, as
recorded in the annual reports, that section 316 (Tariff
Act of 1922), and section 337 of the more recent act
were intended as anti-dumping measures. Nevertheless,
the fact remains that the President is authorized to
suppress almost anything which might appear to him to be
opposed to the best interest of such domestic manufac-
turers as are, in his opinion, efficiently operated.
If the President's control of the tariff is to be
continued, and it seems likely that it is, what is defin-
itely needed is the coordination of administrative pro-
visions. There is no logical reason why the anti -dumping
provisions in the present tariff law (section 303 -
Tariff Act of 1930) should not become .an integral part
of the general flexible tariff plan.

On the other hand, if the anti-dumping provisions
are to remain subject to the arbitrary action of the
Secretary of the Treasury, it would be consistent with
the generally accepted practices of administrative pro-
cedure if the observance of some reasonable form of
notice or hearing were required. Even though the Cus-
toms Court has asserted its authority over the findings
of the Secretary in two particular cases, the action of
the Court may come too late to avert serious damage.
COMPREHENSIVE ABSTRACT
The general conclusion to be deduced from this
treatise is that the tariff policy pursued by the United
States since the termination of World WAR I and until
the adoption of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act in
1934 has resulted in a greater degree of administrative
control and accompanying problems in our tariff policy.
The growth of the present day administered tariff policy
has been due to a variety of factors.
According to Section 315 of the Tariff Act of 1922,
Congress put into operation customs rates which would
equalize the difference between foreign and domestic
production costs. It is an elementary fact that inter-
national trade flourishes primarily as a result of these
cost differences. The rigid application of Section 315
(
which the President was authorized to enforce could prac-
tically terminate the foreign trade of the United States.
At least it could stop the importation of all goods ex-
cept those on the free list.
While there is still widespread opinion that a dele-
gation of legislative authority is contrary to our
established constitutional principles, the courts have
gradually built up the theory that the President is acting
administratively so long as he is carrying out the pre-
scribed wishes of Congress. According to this theory
the law is passed when Congress delegates the authority.
It merely remains in repose until the President, in the
future, discovers a named contingency, at which time he
puts the law into force. Under such a theory, Congress
delegated to the President the authority to establish
cost equalization tariffs. This cost equalization is to
be enforced not only by the administrative manipulation
of tariff rates, but also by changing the place of valu-
ation and by changing classifications.
But the Presidents power in tariff matters is not
limited to what is delegated by Congress. If we consider
his political role, he may even be the creator of the
general policy of the Congress. As the head of the party
in power, the principal dispenser of political patronage,
the one leader representing the country as a whole, he
i
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is often In a position to shape the government's program
and to force it through the legislature.
For an example of the President's dominant role In
the confusion of tariff making, one need not look beyond
the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the so
called flexible tariff. In 1922 the plan was introduced
with the backing of President Harding, after the Hardney
bill had reached the Senate. Again in 1930 the plan,
backed by President Hoover, easily passed the House, but
encountered stiff opposition and initial defeat in the
Senate. Its final readoption was unquestionably due to
pressure from the White House.
To say that adjusting tariff rates to the cost
equalization formula is making a scientific tariff is to
presume that the application of such a formula is prac-
ticable and devoid of administrative problems. Even if
we omit a number of distinct meanings which "cost of »
production" may suggest to economists, and confine our-
selves to money costs, or the other expenses of produc-
tion, we are still without the definite standard of
measurement required by the scientist. Indeed, there are
so many speculative elements involved as to render the
prescribed standard very elastic and largely dependent
upon the interpretations of its administrators. Such
interpretations are reflections of policy. The cost
••
•
1
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investigator is inclined to vary his emphasis according
to the desired results. However conscientious he may be,
he ultimately finds himself in the realm of speculation;
and in this realm he may subconsciously give way to
prejudices. Two experts, or two groups of experts, might
be sent out to ascertain, independently of each other,
costs of the same articles; and the chances are they
would return with widely varying results. This could
happen without any unprofessional conduct on the part of
either group. The very fact that all cost elements in-
volved are constantly fluctuating makes the ascertainment
of any conclusive figure a matter of some arbitrariness.
Unless the Tariff Commission, in making its inves-
tigations as to costs, demonstrates that the desired in-
formation can be definitely and conclusively ascertained,
the idea of a scientific tariff based on the cost
equalization policy fails. And according to the doctrine
of the separation of powers expounded by the Supreme Court
4
in the case of Field v. Clark Congress may delegate its
taxing power to the President only when the realm of
executive action is precisely stated and the facts upon
which he is to base his action may be certainly ascer-
tained. Upon the same principle, Congress gave the
4. See Chapter IV, section on Delegation of Legislative
Authority.
i
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President authority to alter the tariff rates and to
equalize the production costs. And the Supreme Court
put the stamp of approval upon this delegation of
authority, thereby proclaiming that it is within the
Presidents power legally to definitely ascertain "both
foreign and domestic costs. If, therefore, the Commis-
sion finds that in practice such facts cannot be conclu-
sively ascertained, then not only does the conception of
a scientific tariff based on such a policy fail, but the
Court's theory also breaks down. If it does not coincide
with the facts, it becomes a mere legal fiction.
Regardless of the legal fiction involved, some
change in the administration policy of our tariff policy
is necessary. The situation which has existed in the
Tariff Commission since the adoption of the flexible plan
has been anything but satisfactory. Even the reorganiza-
tion in 1930 had little effect upon the actual situation.
The tendency has been to blame the personnel of the Com-
mission for matters which were not within its power to
control. While some of its members may not have been of
the highest calibre, the trouble has existed in some
measure when its membership was of the best. At the
bottom of the trouble lies this elastic yardstick - the
cost of production formula - about which there have been
numerous honest opinions and varied problems. The use
•1
1
of such an elastic standard encourages rather than dis-
courages political speculation in tariff matters.
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